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Department of State: The Right to
Appellate Review of Administrative
Determinations of Loss of Nationality
ALAN G. JAMES*
The Chairman of the Board of Appellate Review traces the origins
and development of this autonomous, quasi-judicial body, and ex-
amines its role as adjudicator of appeals from the Department of
State's administrative determinations of loss of nationality. Ana-
lyzing illustrative decisions of the Board and applicable judicial
precedent, the author focuses his inquiry into the appellate pro-
cess on the crucial issue in loss of nationality proceedings: whether
a citizen who performed a statutory expatriating act intended to
relinquish "man's most basic right"-citizenship.
APPELLATE REVIEW AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
For nearly twenty years the Board of Appellate Review (Board)
has been hearing appeals of expatriated Americans to recover what
Chief Justice Warren called "man's most basic right" ---citizenship.'
To those who chose to contest the Department of State's (Depart-
* B.A. 1943, Williams College; LL.B. 1947, Yale Law School. Mr. James retired
from the Foreign Service in 1980 and in February 1982 was appointed Chairman of the
Board of Appellate Review. The opinions expressed in this Article are the author's and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State or members of the Board.
1. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Warren observed: "Citizenship is man's most basic right for it is nothing else
than the right to have rights." (emphasis in original).
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ment) determination of loss of their nationality, the Board offers an
administrative remedy in the form of a quasi-judicial hearing or
review.
Under law, the Secretary of State is responsible for determining
the nationality of a person outside the United States.' This responsi-
bility the Secretary has delegated to the Assistant Secretary of State
for Consular Affairs.3
In determining that a citizen has expatriated himself, the Depart-
ment does not conceptually "take away" citizenship. As Chief Jus-
tice Warren explained: "In recognizing the consequences of such ac-
tion, the Government is not taking away United States citizenship
. . . .Rather, the Government is simply giving formal recognition to
the inevitable consequence of the citizen's own voluntary surrender
of his citizenship."
4
2. Immigration and Nationality Act § 104(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(3) (1982)
[hereinafter cited as INA], provides:
The Secretary of State shall be charged with the administration and enforce-
ment of the provisions of this Act and all other immigration and nationality
laws relating to ....
(3) the determination of the nationality of a person not in the United States.
He shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of reports, entries and
other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems
necessary for carrying out such provisions.
3. The Assistant Secretary has in turn delegated this authority to the Director of
the Office of Citizens Consular Services, who further delegated it to certain officials of
that office. Memorandum to Mr. Alan A. Gise, (Director of the Office of Citizens Consu-
lar Services) from Ms. Barbara M. Watson, (Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs) (January 12, 1979).
4. Perez, 356 U.S. at 68-69 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Regarding the right of
citizens to relinquish citizenship without sanction of the state, the Chief Justice said:
In the early days of this Nation the right of expatriation had been a matter of
controversy. The common-law doctrine of perpetual allegiance was evident in
the opinions of this Court. And, although impressment of naturalized Ameri-
can seamen of British birth was a cause of the War of 1812, the executive
officials of this Government were not unwaivering in their support of the right
of expatriation. Prior to 1868 all efforts to obtain congressional enactments
concerning expatriation failed. The doctrine of perpetual allegiance, however,
was so ill-suited to this growing nation whose doors were open to immigrants
from abroad that it could not last.
Id. at 67.
The right of expatriation was recognized by the Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249 15 Stat.
223, 223-24, which provides:
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people,
indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; and whereas, in the recognition of this principle, this government
has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the
rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens,
with their descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the
governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public
peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally dis-
avowed: Therefore. . .any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision
of any officer of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions
the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of this government.
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Since the fifth amendment to the Constitution shields citizenship,
determinations of loss of nationality must be made in accordance
with due process of law. In considering appeals from such determi-
nations, the Board must determine whether an individual received
procedural and substantive due process when the Department de-
cided he or she forfeited United States nationality by performing a
statutory expatriating act in a foreign state. If the Board concludes
the Department's decision is contrary to law or fact, it will grant
relief by reversing that decision.
The Board is not a statutory body; it derives its authority from the
Code of Federal Regulations." In reviewing loss of nationality deter-
minations, the Board construes applicable statutory provisions and
applies them to diverse factual situations on the basis of relevant
case law. Like a court, the Board makes findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law.
Federal regulations give the Board broad authority, empowering
the Board to take any action appropriate and necessary to the dispo-
sition of the cases appealed to it.6 The Board may take cognizance of
any evidence deemed relevant and material to the issues of the case,
and, in its discretion, may undertake further investigation of facts
and circumstances.7 In essence, the review conducted by the Board is
a de novo examination of the entire proceedings leading to the De-
partment's determination of loss of an individual's United States
citizenship.
The Board is an autonomous body within the Department of
Nearly 40 years passed, however, before Congress legislated on expatriation.
Until the enactment of the law of March 2, 1907, "in reference to the expatria-
tion of citizens and their protection abroad," there was no mode of renuncia-
tion of citizenship prescribed by our laws, with the exception of Section 1998,
of the Revised Statutes, by virtue of which desertion from the Army or Navy
works forfeiture of the rights of citizenship. Whether expatriation had taken
place in any case was to be determined by the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. No general rule that would apply to all cases could be laid
down.
F. VAN DYNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NATURALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES
336 (1907).
In 1940 a major revision of nationality law occurred with enactment of the Nationality
Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525, (effective Dec. 24, 1952) superseded the Act of 1940.
5. 22 C.F.R. Part 7, §§ 7.1-.11, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,825 (1979). 22 C.F.R. Part 7
superseded regulations that governed the Board from its inception in 1967. It was
promulgated pursuant to authority granted to the Secretary of State by INA §
104(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6. 22 C.F.R. § 7.2(a) (1979).
7. Id. § 7.6(b).
State. Its decisions are final, subject only to either party's right to
move for reconsideration." An appellant whose loss of nationality has
been affirmed by the Board may institute an action in United States
District Court for a judgment declaring him to be a United States
citizen.9
For administrative purposes the Board is assigned to the office of
the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.'0 The merits of an
appeal or a decision of the Board are not, however, subject to review
by the Legal Adviser or any other Department official. 1
By membership and its position within the Department, the Board
is wholly separate from the authority making determinations of
United States nationality-the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Officers
of the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Office of the Legal Ad-
viser have scrupulously respected the independence of the Board, for
all accept that the Board's credibility is a function of its acting, and
being perceived to act, as an independent adjudicatory body.
The operations and staff of the Board of Appellate Review are
modest compared with those of an analogous administrative appel-
late body, the Board of Immigration Appeals of the Department of
Justice. That Board annually hears several thousand appeals taken
by aliens from adverse determinations of eligibility to enter or re-
main in the United States. Over the past eighteen years the Board of
Appellate Review has heard and decided approximately 350 appeals
from determinations of loss of nationality-more than 170 since
1982.12 The Board's importance should not be judged by the number
of cases it hears and decides, but rather by how well it discharges its
mandate to provide a forum for fair and objective administrative ad-
judication of this fundamental right.
This Article examines the Board as adjudicator of citizenship ap-
peals. The appellate process in the Department evolved slowly but
inexorably toward greater autonomy for the panel charged with re-
viewing determinations of loss of nationality. As will appear from the
following discussion of the Board's antecedents, its predecessors did
not enjoy the latitude to make the wholly independent judgments
that is a hallmark of the Board of Appellate Review.
In examining the Board's deliberations, a number of its recent de-
8. Id. §§ 7.8-.9.
9. The right to institute such an action is provided by INA § 360, 8 U.S.C. §
1503 (1982). See infra note 62 and accompanying text. The Department has no judicial
recourse from an adverse decision of the Board.
10. 22 C.F.R. § 7.2(b) (1979).
11. id.
12. Of the 185 decisions rendered from 1982 through 1985, the Board affirmed
the Department's holding of loss of nationality in 50; reversed the Department in 30;
remanded 28 at the request of the Department for the purpose of vacating the certificate
of loss of nationality; and dismissed 77 as not timely filed.
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cisions will be analyzed. The centerpiece of this analysis is an in-
quiry into the issue of whether a citizen intended to relinquish
United States citizenship when he or she performed a statutory ex-
patriating act.
The Board was established a few months after the Supreme Court
rendered its germinal decision in Afroyim v. Rusk.13 Interpreted by
the Attorney General in 1969,14 and by the Supreme Court in 1980
in Vance v. Terrazas,15 to stand for the proposition that loss of citi-
zenship depends on the intent of the citizen to relinquish citizenship,
Afroyim endowed nationality law with a constitutional quality that
was not, evidently, either intended or envisaged by Congress. From
the first, a party's intent to relinquish or retain citizenship has been
the pivotal issue in most cases that the Board decides on the merits.
ANTECEDENTS
On October 21, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed a
departmental order creating a Board of Review in the Passport Divi-
sion of the Department of State.16 This order charged the three-
member panel with reviewing all cases involving the loss of national-
ity under the United States nationality laws. As stated in the Order,
"the Board will provide a forum for hearings and discussions to obvi-
ate as far as may be practicable hardships and inequities in the ap-
plication of the new Nationality Act of 1940 . .. ."
At that stage the Board of Review was not a true appellate body
with authority to hear and decide appeals from determinations of
loss of nationality. It was a creature of the Passport Division charged
with reviewing certificates of loss of nationality upon submission to
the Department by diplomatic or consular officers, as required by the
Nationality Act of 1940.11 Findings of the Board of Review were
13. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
14. 42 Op. Att'y. Gen. 397 (1969).
15. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
16. Dep't of State Order No. 994 (Oct. 31, 1941).
17. Section 501 of the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 501, 54 Stat. 1137,
1171 (superseded 1952) provided:
Whenever a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States has reason to
believe that a person while in a foreign state has lost his American nationality
under any provision of chapter IV of this Act, he shall certify the facts upon
which such belief is based to the Department of State, in writing, under regula-
tions to be prescribed by the Secretary of State. If the report of the diplomatic
or consular officer is approved by the Secretary of State, a copy of the certifi-
cate shall be forwarded to the Department of Justice, for its information, and
the diplomatic or consular office in which the report was made shall be directed
to forward a copy of the certificate to the person to whom it relates.
subject to final approval by a senior official of the Passport Divi-
sion."' Relatively little information is available about the early work
of the Board of Review. Apparently it operated for some years with-
out formal rules of procedure. Its first formal procedures were set
out in an intra-Departmental circular sent to all diplomatic and con-
sular posts in 1949.19
That document stated that persons who did not accept the Depart-
ment's holding of loss of nationality "may be informed that appeal
may be made to the Board of the Passport Division." No formal
application or petition was required, but an appellant was expected
to submit a statement clearly setting out the grounds of appeal.
There was no prescribed time limit on appeal.20
That the Board of Review was not a true appellate body prior to
1949 was made clear by the circular in which it was noted that more
than 100 actions were pending in federal courts for judgments de-
claring petitioners, who had performed a statutory expatriating act,
to be citizens of the United States. Foreign Service posts were cau-
tioned to document the performance of expatriating acts more thor-
oughly in order to avoid unnecessary litigation.
For a number of years the procedures of the Board of Review
were reissued periodically as intra-Departmental guidelines without
significant modification. In 1958 the Board of Review was renamed
the Board of Review on the Loss of Nationality.21 Although desig-
nated an autonomous body within the Passport Office, the Board
could hardly be described as wholly autonomous. The Director of the
Passport Office would still appoint the members. And although deci-
sions of the Board constituted the final determination of the issues of
citizenship and nationality by the Secretary of State, before a deci-
sion affirming a holding of loss of nationality became final, it was to
be referred to the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.22
A virtually identical provision was incorporated into INA § 358, 8 U.S.C. § 1501
(1982). See infra text accompanying note 26.
18. Dep't of State Order No. 994 (Oct. 31, 1941).
19. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN SERVICE SERIAL No. 1019 (Sept. 13, 1949).
20. Id.
21. Administrative Policy Directive P-30 from Frances G. Knight, Director of the
Passport Office, to all passport office employees (Apr. 10, 1958).
22. Shortly after issuance, the foregoing policy directive, id., was amended to pro-
vide that where an administrative decision on loss of nationality was upheld by the
Board, all findings of fact and conclusions of law "shall be referred" to the Legal Adviser
of the Department of State for advice and comment prior to the final entry of the deci-
sion. Administrative Policy Directive P-38 from Frances G. Knight, Director of the Pass-
port Office, to all passport office employees, (Sept. 23, 1958).
In a memorandum dated April 21, 1961, the Assistant Legal Adviser responsible for
consular affairs informed the Director of the Passport Office that it was no longer neces-
sary that all decisions of the Board affirming the Department's holding of loss of nation-
ality be referred to the Legal Adviser; referral would be necessary only in cases involving
new or very complex questions. The Assistant Legal Adviser gave the following rationale
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The first federal regulations governing the Board of Review on the
Loss of Nationality were published in 1966.23 Although the Board
remained a constituent element of the Passport Office, the Secretary
of State henceforth would designate the Board's chairman and its
members.24 For the first time the regulations placed a limitation on
the right to appeal a loss of nationality determination, namely,
"within a reasonable time" after the affected person received notice
of the Department's holding of loss of nationality.25
The 1966 regulations made no provision for informing an expatri-
ate of the right of appeal when the individual was sent a copy of an
approved certificate of loss of nationality; nor does the statute give
such a right. It provides merely that if the Department approves a
certificate of loss of nationality, the diplomatic or consular office
making the report shall forward a copy of the certificate to the per-
son to whom it relates.26 As early as 1954, however, Departmental
for this opinion:
The purpose [of referral] was to assure that the views of this office and the
Board on the proper application of the law were in harmony, one consequence
of which would be to improve our record in the courts in cases where the De-
partment's decisions as to loss of nationality were challenged. It was not our
intention that this procedure should be permanent, but that it should be discon-
tinued when its objectives were accomplished. I feel that the time has come
when it is no longer necessary for all decisions of the Board finding that a
passport applicant has lost his citizenship need be submitted to this office. For
some time, the Board's decisions have been in harmony with views previously
expressed by this office as to the meaning and application of the law ....
Memorandum from Mr. Raymond Yingling, Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Af-
fairs to Ms. Francis G. Knight, Director of the Passport Office (Apr. 21, 1961). In 1961
the Director of the Passport Office issued an instruction which stipulated that henceforth
referral to the Legal Adviser would be at the discretion of the Director. TECHNICAL
PROGRAM INSTRUCTION 3520.1a (Nov. 21, 1961).
23. 22 C.F.R. §§ 50.60-.72, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,539 (1966).
24. Id. § 50.62.
25. Id. § 50.60 provided:
A person who contends that the Department's administrative holding of loss of
nationality or expatriation in his case is contrary to law or fact shall be enti-
tled, upon written request made within a reasonable time after receipt of notice
of such holding, to appeal to the Board of Review on Loss of Nationality.
26. INA § 358, 8 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982) provides:
Whenever a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States has reason to
believe that a person while in a foreign state has lost his United States nation-
ality under any provision of Part III of this subchapter, or under any provision
of chapter IV of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, he shall certify the
facts upon which such belief is based to the Department of State, in writing,
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State. If the report of the
diplomatic or consular officer is approved by the Secretary of State, a copy of
the certificate shall be forwarded to the Attorney General, for his information,
and the diplomatic or consular office in which the report was made shall be
directed to forward a copy of the certificate to the person to whom it relates.
guidelines stipulated that consular officers should inform an expatri-
ate in writing of the right to appeal when forwarding the certificate
of loss of nationality.
27
On July 28, 1967, the Department established the Board of Appel-
late Review in the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary for Adminis-
tration. The stated purpose behind the Board's creation was to cen-
tralize administrative appeal procedures, including hearings,
required by law or regulations or as otherwise provided by the
Department.28
Two general concerns led to the creation of the Board. One
stemmed from considerations of efficiency. Prior to 1967 there were
separate panels to hear appeals from determinations of loss of na-
tionality, denial of passport facilities, certain contract disputes, and
personnel decisions. Many officials in the Department felt that con-
solidating the functions of these separate boards into one tribunal
would improve the appellate process and make better use of person-
nel. Equally persuasive was the view of a number of senior officials,
particularly in the Office of the Legal Adviser, that the appellate
process should be, and be seen to be, clearly separate from the func-
tion of determining a person's nationality. However professional and
impartial Board members were, there was a general sense, even
before 1967, that the requirements of due process dictated that the
Board not be part of the Passport Office.
Initially, the Board operated under the federal regulations issued
in 1966 for the Board of Review on the Loss of Nationality. On
November 29, 1967, new federal regulations were promulgated.2 9
Those regulations prescribed that the Deputy Undersecretary for
Administration would appoint the members of the Board, and that
the Board would have jurisdiction over appeals from determinations
of loss of nationality; denials of passport facilities; certain contract
disputes; and, to a very limited extent, personnel matters. The new
regulations prescribed that the affected party might file an appeal
within a reasonable time after receipt of notice of the Department's
loss of nationality holding.
Available records tell little about the activities of the Board of
Appellate Review during the first year and a half of its existence.
Shortly before the establishment of the Board, the Supreme Court
27. 2 FOREIGN SERVICE MANUAL, ADVICE ON MAKING OF APPEALS § 238.1
(1954).
28. Foreign Affairs Manual Circular (July 28, 1967).
29. 22 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-.3, 50.60-.71, 51.89-.105, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,539 (1966) as
amended 32 Fed. Reg. 16,258 (1967).
The limitation on appeal was "within a reasonable time" after the affected person
received notice of the Department's holding of loss of nationality. 22 C.F.R. § 50.60
(1967) (the text of which was the same as that in 22 C.F.R. § 50.60 (1966), supra note
25).
268
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decided Afroyim v. Rusk"° which raised novel constitutional issues.
Afroyim necessitated consultations between the State and Justice
Departments to determine how the administrative authorities should
apply the case to loss of nationality statutes. The Board therefore
decided no loss of nationality appeals until several months after the
Attorney General issued a statement interpreting Afroyim. 31
On July 1, 1979, the Department transferred the Board to the Of-
fice of the Legal Adviser for administrative support. The Depart-
ment promulgated the present regulations for the Board on Novem-
ber 30, 1979.32
THE BOARD AND ITS FUNCTIONS
Membership
As presently constituted, the Board of Appellate Review has two
regular members: the chairman and a consultant to the Board. Both
are professional employees of the Department of State and devote
their full time to the Board.
In addition, there are nine ad hoc members of the Board, senior
career officials of the Department who have other regularly assigned
responsibilities and serve on the Board without additional compensa-
tion. None is an official of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, thus en-
suring complete separation of the appellate function from the admin-
istrative function of making loss of nationality determinations. Ad
hoc members give the Board depth, bringing diverse experiences and
insights to bear on the appellate process.
The Legal Adviser of the Department of State appoints all the
members of the Board. There is no prescribed limit on a member's
tenure.33 Regular and ad hoc members must be attorneys in good
standing, admitted to practice before the Bar in any state, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States. 4
In hearing an appeal the Board acts through a panel of three
members. No more than two of the panel members may be ad hoc
members.3 5
30. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
31. 42 Op. Att'y. Gen. 397 (1969).
32. See supra note 5.
33. 22 C.F.R. § 7.4(a) (1985).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 7.4(c).
The Appellate Process
The Department must inform persons who have been the subject
of an adverse determination of nationality of the right to appeal to
the Board of Review.36 Notice of this right is conveyed by informa-
tion printed on the reverse of the certificate of loss of nationality
which by law must be forwarded to the expatriate after the Depart-
ment has approved it.37 The limitation on appeal is one year after
approval of the certificate of loss of nationality.38 The appellant or
authorized attorney must address an appeal to the Board in writing.
The petition must state with particularity the grounds for the appeal,
specifically why the appellant contends the Department's determina-
tion of loss of nationality is contrary to law or fact.39 The Board is
not restrictive in judging whether an appellant has stated grounds
for a proper appeal, but insists that the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the performance of the expatriating act be clearly spelled
out and that the appellant adequately document his or her
allegations.
Although there is no requirement, an appellant may submit a legal
brief in support of an appeal.," Appellants may retain counsel, but
legal representation is not a prerequisite. To practice before the
Board, an attorney must be a member of the Bar in good standing,
admitted to practice before any court in a United States
jurisdiction. 1
Pleadings open with submission of an appellant's brief or personal
statement of appeal. If the appellant's submission is found to state a
cause of action, the Board forwards it to the Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Consular Affairs (Passport Services) who in turn
refers it to the Office of Citizenship Appeals and Legal Assistance,
the office representing the Department in loss of nationality proceed-
ings before the Board. The Department has sixty days to submit the
administrative record upon which it based the loss of nationality de-
termination and a brief setting forth the position of the Department
on the appeal.4 2 After the Department files its brief, the Board for-
36. Id. § 50.52. This section provides that:
When an approved certificate of loss of nationality or certificate of expatriation
is forwarded to the person to whom it relates or his or her representative, such
person or representative shall be informed of the right to appeal the Depart-
ment's determination to the Board of Appellate Review (Part 7 of this chapter)
within one year after approval of the certificate of loss of nationality or certifi-
cate of expatriation.
37. INA § 358, 8 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982). See supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
38. 22 C.F.R. § 7.5(b) (1985).
39. Id. § 7.5(a).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 7.11(a).
42. Id. § 7.5(c), (d).
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wards a copy to the appellant who may submit a reply brief within
thirty days.43
If the Department concludes it is unable to sustain its burden of
proof after the appellant files an appeal, it may request that the
Board remand the case for the purpose of vacating the certificate of
loss of nationality." Provided it has jurisdiction over the case and
there are no manifest errors of law or fact, the Board consistently
grants such requests.
An appellant may elect or waive oral argument.45 If oral argument
is waived the Board will decide the case on the basis of all written
submissions and the administrative record upon which the Depart-
ment based its loss of nationality holding."
An appellant who elects oral argument may appear pro se, or by
43. Id. § 7.5(d). For good cause shown, the Board may enlarge the time for filing
briefs and other documents, or the taking of any action under Part 7. Id. § 7.10.
44. By 1976 the Board became seriously concerned about the Passport Office's
persistent and unacceptable practice of reviewing and reversing administrative holdings
of loss of nationality after an appeal had been taken to the Board. This practice, it was
asserted, effectively precluded the Board from exercising its appellate jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the Department's regulations. To correct this situation the Board proposed a re-
mand procedure to the Passport Office, offering the following rationale:
It is appreciated that, once an appeal has been with the Board, the Passport
Office may on occasion conclude that it is unable to meet the burden of proof
required by section 349(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [see infra
note 106] or to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant
intended by his acquisition of foreign nationality or other expatriating conduct
to relinquish his United States citizenship. In circumstances of that character,
we believe that the Passport Office should promptly inform the Board of its
views on the appeal, forward the case record for the Board's consideration, and
request the Board to remand the case to the Passport Office for further pro-
ceedings. The Board would thus have an opportunity to consider the matter
and take whatever action "it considers necessary and proper to the disposition"
of the case appealed to it, as provided in 22 CFR 50.63.
[W]e consider that the jurisdiction of the Board attaches concurrently with the
appellant's notice of appeal to the Board and thereafter it is the Board's exclu-
sive function to decide the disposition of the appeal.
Memorandum to Frances G. Knight, Director of the Passport Office, from Edward G.
Misey, Chairman of the Board of Appellate Review (Oct. 29, 1976).
Concurring in this proposal, the Director of the Passport Office stated:
It is understood that the Board will give sympathetic consideration to requests
for remand. It is hoped that the remand request would be viewed as a proce-
dural matter which would be granted automatically unless the Board found
that the determination made by the Passport Office was based upon very sub-
stantial misapprehension of fact, or misinterpretation of law. However, it is
understood, that the final decision on remanding cases rests with the Board.
Memorandum to Edward G. Misey, Chairman of the Board of Appellate Review, from
Frances G. Knight, Director of the Passport Office (Apr. 26, 1977).
45. 22 C.F.R. § 7.5(e) (1985).
46. Id.
or with an attorney.' 7 Hearings are informal and not governed
strictly by the federal rules of evidence and procedure.41 The Board
grants the parties considerable latitude in presenting their cases. The
admissibility of any evidence, however, is subject to the general rules
of relevance, competency and materiality.49 Parties may present wit-
nesses, offer evidence, make oral argument, and confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses.50 The Board may require supplemental
statements on issues presented, or confirmation, verification or au-
thentication of any evidence submitted by the parties.51 Hearings are
private unless the appellant requests, in writing, that the public be
admitted. 52 A qualified reporter makes a transcript of the proceed-
ings which becomes part of the permanent record. 53
Although an increasing number of appellants request oral argu-
ment,54 most appellants waive personal appearance. Most live
abroad, and for various reasons consider it difficult or too expensive
to appear before the Board in Washington, D.C. where hearings are
held. From the Board's perspective, hearings have positive value.
They animate the dry record and enable the Board to assess the ap-
pellant's credibility through examination and cross examination by
counsel and its own questioning of the appellant. Hearings are also
invariably helpful in clarifying facts that are ambiguous or not accu-
rately elucidated by the record.
Although the regulations provide a party may appear by counsel,
the Board found this less than satisfactory in the few instances
where an appellant elected not to appear but instructed counsel to
make an oral argument. On occasion, the attorney has not actually
met the appellant and is unable to convey a fair impression of the
kind of person the appellant is. More important, the human dimen-
sion is missing. Many lay appellants appearing pro se have made
more effective presentations than counsel appearing on behalf of an
absent client.
Decisions and Decisionmaking
Generally, the Board renders its decision about nine months after
entry of an appeal, unless facts or issues must be clarified, or the
parties request an extension to file briefs or obtain and submit addi-
tional evidence. The Board must decide each case on the basis of the
47. Id. § 7.5(k).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 7.5(g).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 7.6(b).
52. Id. § 7.6(c).
53. Id. § 7.6(d).
54. In one-third of the cases decided in 1984 the Board heard oral argument.
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entire record of the proceedings.55 When pleadings are complete, the
Chairman selects two other members to constitute the required panel
of three. A conference is held on each appeal; in finely balanced
cases, protracted consultation may be necessary before a comfortable
decision can be reached. Decisions are by majority vote. 56 Written
opinions set out the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon
which the Board bases its decision.57 Subject to the right of either
party to move for reconsideration,58 decisions of the Board are final,
and thus the conclusive determination of a person's nationality by
the Department of State.
A motion for reconsideration must state precisely where the Board
overlooked or misapprehended any points of law or fact. If the Board
grants the motion, it must review the record of the proceedings and
affirm, modify or reverse its original decision. By definition, a motion
for reconsideration does not permit the introduction of new evidence.
Although the regulations make no express provision for the Board
to entertain a motion to reopen, the Board's general discretionary
authority to "take any action it considers appropriate and necessary
to the disposition of cases appealed to it,"59 may reasonably be con-
strued to permit the filing of such a motion. The Board took this
position in a recent case where an appellant moved for reconsidera-
tion of the Board's decision affirming the Department's determina-
tion of loss of his nationality. 60
Although framed as a motion for reconsideration (it was alleged
the Board had overlooked points of law), the Board considered it
more properly as a motion to reopen because the appellant at-
tempted to introduce new evidence. The Board denied the motion
55. 22 C.F.R. § 7.8 (1985).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 7.9 provides in part as follows:
The Board may entertain a motion for reconsideration of a Board's decision,
if filed by either party. The motion shall state with particularity the grounds
for the motion, including any facts or points of law which the filing party
claims the Board has overlooked or misapprehended, and shall be filed within
30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision of the Board by the
party filing the motion. Oral argument on the motion shall not be permitted.
However, the party in opposition to the motion will be given opportunity to file
a memorandum in opposition to the motion within 30 days of the date the
Board forwards a copy of the motion to the party in opposition. If the motion
to reconsider is granted, the Board shall review the record, and, upon such
further reconsideration, shall affirm, modify, or reverse the original decision of
the Board in the case.
59. 22 C.F.R. § 7.2(a) (1979).
60. In re R.J.C., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Aug. 14, 1985).
qua motion for reconsideration on the grounds it did not show the
Board overlooked or misapprehended any points of law in the origi-
nal decision. The Board also denied the motion qua motion to reopen
on the grounds the evidence appellant sought to introduce was inad-
missible because it was demonstrably discoverable with due diligence
before the litigation ended.
Since January 1984 the Board has been publishing selected deci-
sions as a matter of public record, copies of which may be obtained
by making a written request to the Board. Decisions rendered before
1984 may be reviewed in the Board's offices.
Decisions as Precedent
There is no provision in the applicable federal regulations for the
Board to designate selected decisions as precedent in cases involving
the same or similar issues. Over the years the Board has not as a
matter of practice expressly cited specific decisions as precedential.
Furthermore, neither the Board nor the Department considers a
prior decision binding on the Department in making subsequent na-
tionality determinations. Board members realize adherence to the
doctrine of stare decisis is generally conducive to impartiality and
stability of decisions, and that decisions in outwardly similar cases
should be rationally consistent. No requirement exists, however, for
the Board to cite previously decided cases or to distinguish them
from the case at bar.
In effect, many decisions are precedential because they involve ap-
plication by the Board of well-settled judicial rulings to factual pat-
terns similar to those the federal courts have confronted in loss of
nationality proceedings. In another class of cases involving naturali-
zation in a foreign state not requiring renunciation of previous na-
tionality or allegiance, the Board operates in a judicially gray area.
Apposite judicial precedent is minimal, as the discussion in the "In-
tent to Relinquish United States Citizenship" section of this Article
will illustrate.0' In this class of cases, it would be inappropriate for
the Board to designate certain cases as precedent. Indeed, it would
probably be difficult to achieve the necessary unanimity within the
Board to do so, given the lack of judicial precedent and the fact that
members are not in uniform agreement on how to apply broad legal
principles to specific facts.
Therefore, one should not regard published decisions as precedent.
The Board selects them for publication mainly because they involve
interesting fact patterns and illustrate the Board's general approach
to the disposition of a variety of appeals.
61. See infra notes 189-224 and accompanying text.
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Judicial Review of Decisions of the Board
A person whose expatriation the Board affirms may institute an
action in a federal district court to be declared a United States citi-
zen. In such an action the cause is heard de novo.62
A number of unsuccessful appellants before the Board have insti-
tuted such actions, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Vance
v. Terrazas6 3 being the most notable example.
The administrative authorities have consistently accepted the deci-
sions of the Board of Appellate Review as the final determination of
a person's nationality by the Department of State. In 1972, however,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) challenged the
62. INA § 360(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
If any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege as a
national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any de-
partment or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is
not a national of the United States, such person may institute an action under
the provisions of section 2201 of title 28, [United States Code], against the
head of such department or independent agency for a judgment declaring him
to be a national of the United States . . . . An action under this subsection
may be instituted only within five years after the final administrative denial of
such right or privilege and shall be filed in the district court of the United
States for the district in which such person resides or claims a residence ....
Paragraph (b) of the same section prescribes how a person not in the United States may
gain entry to institute such an action.
63. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
Other cases decided by the courts after the Board affirmed the Department's holding
of loss of nationality are: Meretsky v. Department of State, No. CV85-1985 (D.D.C.
1985) (appellant's loss of nationality affirmed); Richards v. Secretary of State, No.
CV80-4150 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (appellant's loss of nationality affirmed), afid, 752 F.2d
1413 (9th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Kissinger, No. C75-245 (C.D. Utah 1980) (action dis-
missed by stipulation with order to restore citizenship); Tollefsen v. Vance, No. 79-0009
(D.D.C. 1980) (action dismissed by stipulation with order to restore citizenship); Nemec
v. Rogers, No. 71-1013 (D.D.C. 1972)), (appellant's loss of nationality affirmed); Peter
v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972) (Department's holding of loss of
nationality reversed).
It is doubtful that one whom the Department determines to have lost his or her nation-
ality may bypass the Board and proceed directly to federal court. The Department's loss
of nationality determination is a final administrative denial of a person's right or privi-
lege as a national of the United States; its operative effect is not contingent upon the
fulfillment of any condition subsequent. One held to have expatriated himself does, how-
ever, have the right to seek administrative relief through an appeal to the Board. Some
cases suggest exhaustion of administrative remedies through appeal to the Board is a
condition precedent to instituting an action under § 360 of the statute. See Peter, 347 F.
Supp. at 1037 ("[h]aving exhausted her administrative opportunities, as to which no
question is raised, [plaintiff took an appeal to the Board which affirmed her loss of na-
tionality] she instituted this suit". See also Garcia-Sarquiz v. Saxbe, 407 F. Supp. 789
(S.D. Fla. 1974); Arias-Alonzo v. INS, 391 F. 2d 400 (5th Cir. 1968); Linzalone v.
Dulles, 120 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Board's decision in In re Claude Cartier.64 There, the Board con-
cluded that Cartier acted involuntarily when he formally renounced
his United States nationality in 1964, agreeing with appellant's con-
tention he gave up his United States citizenship against his will
under the duress of family devotion. Accordingly, the Board reversed
the Department's holding of expatriation. The INS refused, however,
to return Cartier's certificate of naturalization on the grounds the
Board's decision was wrong as a matter of law, and referred the
matter to the Attorney General to resolve.65
Before the Attorney General ruled on the matter, Cartier sought a
writ of mandamus in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia to compel the Department of State to issue him a
passport and to compel the INS to return his certificate of naturali-
zation. In February 1973 the Attorney General determined that
Cartier was not a United States citizen."6 He held that the decision
of the Board of Appellate Review was not binding on the Attorney
General in view of the specific provisions of the statute and because
the Board lacked a quorum when the decision was adopted. He also
64. In re Claude Cartier, State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Aug. 7, 1972).
65. Whether the INS concluded sua sponte that the Board's decision in Cartier
was wrong as a matter of law, or whether the INS reached this conclusion after the
Passport Office importuned the INS to attack the decision, is not a matter of record. The
latter conjecture is plausible, however, for the Passport Office registered vigorous dissent.
Memorandum to the Legal Adviser of the Dep't of State, John R. Stevenson, from the
Director of the Passport Office, Frances G. Knight (Sept. 6, 1972). Ms. Knight wrote in
part:
The Passport Office is unalterably opposed to the decision of the Board of Ap-
pellate Review on two grounds. First, the decision is probably invalid legally
since two of its "members" had retired or resigned prior to the date of the
official decision. Second, the decision of the Board is patently incorrect as a
matter of law .... The decision is posited on an imaginary duress. Nowhere
in the record is there any evidence of factual circumstances which forced
Cartier to divest himself of his United States citizenship ... if the Board's
decision is to be followed in this case it will make impossible statutory acts of
voluntary renunciation ....
It is the recommendation of the Passport Office that no passport be issued to
Claude Cartier and that he should be allowed to avail himself of whatever legal
remedies he may have available to him in the Courts. Furthermore, we have
been formally advised by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that they
disagree with the decision of the Board of Appellate Review and have declined
to return to Mr. Cartier his Certificate of Naturalization. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service is referring the Board's decision to the Attorney
General for resolution of the differences between the Department of Justice
and the Department of State.
[I]f this decision is allowed to stand on this reasoning [Ms. Knight called the
decision in Cartier "the most crucial citizenship determination to be made in
any citizenship case yet decided"] there is little sense in trying to enforce the
Congressional intent regarding loss of United States citizenship as manifested
in the existing statutes and interpreted by the Attorney General.
Id.
66. Op. Att'y Gen. File CO-349-P (1979); In re Citizenship Determination of
Claude Cartier, CO-349-P (Feb. 1973).
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concluded that Cartier had not overcome the presumption that he
acted voluntarily. Citing the authority conferred upon him by stat-
ute,17 the Attorney General held that his decision was final and con-
clusive on the executive branch.
On March 9, 1973, the District Court ordered the INS to return
Cartier's certificate of naturalization and ordered the Secretary of
State to issue him a passport.68 The court observed that the Attorney
General never before had attempted an appellate review of a quasi-
judicial decision of the Board of Appellate Review, and found no
such "broad and unfettered" power in the statute. The court held
that the Board's jurisdiction over the appeal attached when the State
Department issued the certificate of loss of nationality to Cartier,
and expressed the view that a violation of due process may exist
since the Department of Justice was without power to act in the
case. Since the Board had rendered its decision in an adversary pro-
ceeding at which the government had been represented, the court
concluded that the decision was binding and conclusive on all officers
and agencies of the United States.
On appeal by the government, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit did not reach the issue of whether deci-
sions of the Board are binding on all agencies of government. It re-
manded the case on procedural grounds.69 The court observed that
because of the "bifurcation" of responsibilities under the statute, the
INS and the Department of State would be called on to address sim-
ilar issues in different contexts, and that neither considered itself
bound by a previous determination of nationality made by the other.
The court found it "unwise" in the context of the proceedings in
Cartier to attempt to resolve the scope of the Attorney General's
power to make controlling determinations of law under the Act, and
the applicability of res judicata to loss of nationality determinations
made by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State pursuant
to the Act.
The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Cartier's
67. INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforce-
ment of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and natu-
ralization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the
powers, functions, and duties conferred upon the President, the Secretary of
State, the officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular of-
ficers: Provided, however, That [sic] determination and ruling by the Attorney
General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.
68. Cartier v. Secretary of State, 356 F. Supp. 460 (D.D.C. 1973).
69. Cartier v. Secretary of State, 506 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
petition without prejudice to renew the action under the provisions of
section 360 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.70 The Supreme
Court denied Cartier's petition for certiorari. 71 He died shortly
thereafter.
Intriguing as it is for the many complex legal issues raised, the
case of Claude Cartier is unique in the Board's experience. Although
the respective responsibilities of the Attorney General and the Secre-
tary of State to make final, binding determinations of a person's na-
tionality remain undelineated judicially, the INS has not formally
challenged a decision rendered by the Board since the Cartier case.
JURISDICTION
Subject Matter
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a United
States national shall lose his nationality by:
(I) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application;
(2) swearing an oath of allegiance or making a formal declaration of alle-
giance to a foreign state;
(3) serving in the armed forces of a foreign state, unless expressly author-
ized by the Secretaries of State and Defense;
(4) serving in the government of a foreign state while having the nationality
of that state; or accepting employment in a foreign state for which an oath
of allegiance is required;
(5) making a formal renunciation of United States nationality before a con-
sular officer of the United States in the form prescribed by the Secretary of
State;
(6) making a formal renunciation of United States nationality in the United
States in wartime in the manner prescribed by, and with the approval of,
the Attorney General; and
(7) committing treason against the United States.
7
1
70, See supra note 62.
71. Cartier v. Secretary of State, 421 U.S. 947 (1975).
72. INA § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a), paras. (1)-(7) (1982). By definition, the
Department's authority to make determinations of loss of nationality under § 349(a) is
limited to paragraphs (1) through (5). Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L.
No, 414, 66 Stat. 163, 267-69; this Act prescribed that five other acts would cause loss of
citizenship:
(a) voting in a political election in a foreign state. [section 349(a)(5) declared
unconstitutional, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)].
(b) deserting the armed forces of the United States in wartime. [section
349(a)(8) declared unconstitutional Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)].
(c) departing or remaining outside the United States in wartime to avoid mili-
tary service, [section 349 (a)(10), declared unconstitutional Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez 372 U.S. 144 (1963), repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1258.]
(d) obtaining the benefits of foreign nationality by a dual national of the
United States and a foreign state who remains in the foreign state for 3 years
after the age of 22. [section 350].
(e) residing for 3 years in the state of one's origin. or 5 years in another foreign
state if one is a naturalized citizen of the United States. [section 352, declared
unconstitutional Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)].
Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 92 Stat. 1046 belatedly tidied up the statute
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The regulations make clear that the Board's jurisdiction in national-
ity matters is limited to hearing appeals from determinations of loss
of nationality based on performance of a statutory expatriating act.73
There is usually no dispute that the Board has subject matter ju-
risdiction. Occasionally, however, persons who expatriated them-
selves by performing a statutory expatriating act may later (often
many years later) apply for a passport which is denied on the
grounds of noncitizenship. They may then appeal to the Board bas-
ing the appeal on denial of a passport. No appeal follows from such
an adverse decision;74 if such a person wishes to proceed, the Board
will consider the appeal to be from the underlying holding of loss of
citizenship.
The Board has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from a determina-
tion that a person born abroad of a United States citizen parent and
an alien parent did not acquire United States citizenship at birth. In
In re P.A.W.L, 7 5 the Department determined that a child born in
by repealing paragraphs 349(a)(5) and 349(a)(8) as well as §§ 350 and 352. It renum-
bered paragraphs 349(a)(6) (formal renunciation); 349(a)(7) (renunciation of United
States nationality in the United States in wartime); and 349(a)(9) (committing treason)
as 349(a)(5), 349(a)(6), and 349(a)(7) respectively. Repeal of § 350 was prospective.
73. 22 C.F.R. § 7.3(a) (1985) provides that the Board shall have jurisdiction over
appeals from administrative determinations of loss of nationality or expatriation under
Subpart C of Part 50 of Chapter I (Department of State). 22 C.F.R. § 50.40 (Subpart
C) (1985), prescribes procedures consular officers shall follow in processing potential loss
of nationality cases and reporting them to the Department for decision, as required by §
358 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
As § 358 states, the cases consular officers are to report are those involving performance
of an act prescribed as expatriating by Chapter 3 of Title III-Loss of Nationality-of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, or by Chapter IV-Loss of Nationality-of the
Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982). Section 7.3(b) also
gives the Board jurisdiction of appeals from administrative determinations denying, re-
voking, restricting or invalidating a passport under §§ 51.70 and 51.71 of Chapter I. The
latter sections prescribe that such action shall be taken when the party is under some
form of legal restraint (generally is the subject a warrant for arrest). In the 1970's, the
Board heard a few such appeals from adverse decisions with respect to a passport; since
then only one such appeal has been filed. Section 7.3(c) also provides the Board with
jurisdiction of appeals from final decisions of contracting officers arising under contracts
or grants of the Department of State, not otherwise provided for. Section 7.3(e) gives
jurisdiction over appeals from administrative decisions of the Department of State in
such other cases and under such terms of reference as the Secretary may authorize. To
date, the Secretary has not designated any cases under this heading.
Effective January 1, 1986, the Board has been given jurisdiction to hear and decide
appeals taken by nationals operating in South Africa from determinations of the Depart-
ment of State that they failed to comply with the Fair Labor Standards set forth in 22
C.F.R. § 61.2 (1985). Amendment of 22 C.F.R. Part 7 will shortly be completed.
74. 22 C.F.R. § 51.80 (1985) expressly excludes administrative review and appeal
to the Board of denial of a passport on grounds of noncitizenship.
75. In re P.A.W.I., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Oct. 5, 1985).
Switzerland to an American father and a Swiss mother did not de-
rive United States citizenship from his father because the father did
not meet the statutory requirements for transmission of citizenship,
that is, he had not resided in the United States for ten years prior to
the child's birth. 7"
The Board pointed out that the applicable regulations limit its ju-
risdiction to hearing appeals from loss of nationality;77 there is no
provision for the Board to consider appeals from decisions of non-
acquisition of citizenship. "Loss of nationality and non-acquisition of
nationality . . . are semantically and conceptually distinguisha-
ble."7 s "Nonacquisition of nationality does not arise from perform-
ance or nonperformance of any specific act by the affected person,
but results from the inability of his or her citizenship parent to fulfill
a congressionally mandated condition precedent to confer citizen-
ship."' 79 The Board recognized that in some nonacquisition of citizen-
ship cases there might be issues of fact or law appropriate for an
administrative appellate body to review, but the present regulations
may not be read as conferring authority that is not there, however
meritorious the appellant's claim may be.80
Timely Filing-A Jurisdictional Imperative
Timely filing is mandatory and jurisdictional."' If an appellant
fails to comply with a condition precedent to the Board's hearing of
his claim, that is, fails to appeal within the applicable limitations
and provides no legally sufficient excuse, he properly suffers dismis-
76. INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982), reads as follows:
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its out-
lying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of
the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present
in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling
not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of
fourteen years; Provided, That (sic) any periods of honorable service in the
Armed Forces of the United States, or periods of employment with the United
States Government or with an international organization as that term is de-
fined in section 228 of title 22 by such citizen parent, or any periods during
which such citizen parent is physically present abroad as the dependent unmar-
ried son or daughter and a member of the household of a person (A) honorably
serving with the Armed Forces of the United States, or (B) employed by the
United States Government or an international organization as defined in sec-
tion 228 of title 22 may be included in order to satisfy the physical-presence
requirement of this paragraph. This proviso shall be applicable to persons born
on or after December 24, 1952, to the same extent as if it had become effective
in its present form on that date.
77. 22 C.F.R. § 7.3(a) (1985); 22 C.F.R. §§ 50.40-.52 (1985).
78. In re P.A.W.I., State Dep't Dec., slip op. at 7 (B. App. R. Oct. 5, 1985).
79. Id. at 7-8.
80. Id. at 8.
81. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
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sal for want of jurisdiction.
8 2
A limitation on appeal ensures adjudication of an appeal in a
manner fair to both parties-the appellant and the Department of
State. The rationale for imposing a time limit is that a party who
has been the subject of an adverse determination of nationality
should have sufficient time to prepare a case showing why in the
individual's opinion the Department erred in holding expatriation oc-
curred. A correlative purpose is to ensure the exercise of the right to
assert a claim to United States citizenship within a circumscribed
period of time to preclude the filing of appeals that could more easily
and fairly have been resolved when events on which the appeal is
based are fresh in the minds of both parties and full records are
available.
Under the present regulations, effective November 30, 1979, a
party must appeal an adverse determination of nationality within one
year after approval of the certificate of loss of nationality.8 3 The lim-
itation period begins to run from the date of approval of the certifi-
cate of loss of nationality, not from the date upon which the appel-
lant received it. If an appeal is not filed within the one year
limitation, it "shall be denied unless the Board determines for good
cause shown that the appeal could not have been filed within the
prescribed limit."184 When the Department forwards an approved
certificate of loss of nationality to the person to whom it relates, that
person must be informed of the right of appeal.8 5 The reverse side of
the certificate of loss of nationality sets out appeal procedures and
the time limit. Thus, if the affected person received the certificate,
there can be no doubt that he or she received notice of the right of
appeal. The specific time limit on appeal and the legal requirement
that an expatriate be expressly informed of the right of appeal un-
doubtedly account for the fact that, with few exceptions, timely ap-
peals are consistently filed from determinations made after Novem-
ber 1979.
Where an appellant files an appeal outside the allowable limit, the
central issue is whether the person can show good cause for not ap-
pealing within one year after approval of the certificate of loss of
nationality. Usually, determining whether an appellant shows good
82. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
83. 22 C.F.R. § 7.5(b) (1985).
84. Id. § 7.5(a).
85. Id. § 50.52. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
cause is a straight forward matter of applying objective criteria.86
Appeals from Determinations of Loss of Nationality Made
Before 1979
Over the past four years, more than one-third of all cases appealed
to the Board were from holdings of loss of nationality made prior to
November 1979. The Board dismissed virtually all as time-barred. If
only a few stale appeals came before the Board, the matter would
require only cursory discussion. Unfortunately, many appellants and
some attorneys do not seem to understand that the Board rarely is
able to entertain long-delayed appeals even though they may argua-
bly present meritorious issues.
Before 1979 the applicable regulations prescribed that a person
who contended the Department's holding of loss of nationality was
contrary to law or fact, might, "within a reasonable time" after re-
ceipt of notice of such holding, take an appeal to the Board of Ap-
pellate Review.87 With respect to appeals taken from a holding of
loss of nationality made prior to November 1979, the Board's prac-
tice is to apply the standard of "reasonable time," rather than the
present limitation. In so doing, the Board follows the general princi-
ple that new or amended regulations shortening the time for appeal
are intended to have a prospective, not retroactive effect, since to
86. What constitutes "good cause" depends on the circumstances of each case. In
general, to excuse a delay of more than one year an appellant must have been confronted
with an event beyond his or her immediate control that was to some extent unforeseeable.
See Wray v. Folsom, 166 F. Supp. 390 (D.C. Ark. 1958); Manges v. First State Bank
and Trust Co., 572 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Syby v. Department of Civ.
Serv., 66 N.J. Super. 460, 169 A.2d 479 (1961); Becker v. Smith, 237 Wisc. 322, 296
N.W. 620 (1937).
Although one appellant presented no persuasive reason for not appealing within one
year after approval of the certificate of loss of nationality, the Board excused her delay
because of the material error of the consulate processing her case. The reverse of the
certificate of loss of nationality sent to appellant in 1982 was blank, i.e., the required
appeal procedures were missing. The Board ascertained that when appellant requested a
copy of those procedures from the consulate, she was given information relevant to mak-
ing appeals under regulations applicable from 1967 to 1979. The Board concluded that
the appellant was entitled to assume she had a flexible period of time-not one
year-within which to appeal, and had evidently acted on that assumption. The Board
thus ruled the consulate's failure to inform appellant of the applicable limitation, as man-
dated by 22 C.F.R. § 50.52 (1985) (see supra note 36), excused her delay. In re L.S.K.,
State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 9, 1985).
87. 22 C.F.R. § 50.60, 32 Fed. Reg. 16,258 (1967). See supra note 29 and ac-
companying text.
The federal regulations governing the Board of Review on the Loss of Nationality, the
predecessor of the Board of Appellate Review, also prescribed a limitation on appeal of
"within a reasonable time" after receipt of notice of the Department's holding of loss of
nationality. 22 C.F.R. § 50.60, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,537 (1966). Prior to 1966, however,
there was no time limit on appeals to the Board of Review on the Loss of Nationality.
The Board of Appellate Review applied the standard of "reasonable time" to appeals
from a loss of nationality determination made prior to 1966. The premise for this stan-
dard is that where no time limit exists, it is customary to follow the common-law rule.
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apply the shorter time limit would disturb a right acquired under
previous regulations.
Of the innumerable judicial renderings of reasonable time,88 the
Board considers the succinct definition in Ashford v. Steuart a fair
and useful rule of thumb: "What constitutes 'reasonable time' de-
pends on the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest
in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to
learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other
parties." 89
Appellants rarely allege that physical constraints or incapacitating
illness prevented them from seeking redress sooner. If proven, such
factors could constitute a legally sufficient excuse for even a very
substantial delay in taking an appeal. In all too many cases, the ex-
cuse offered appears to be an ex post facto rationalization of the
appellant's tardiness.
A common excuse for not taking an appeal until many years after
performance of the expatriating act is that the appellant did not
learn of the Department's holding of loss of nationality until fairly
recently. If proven, the failure of the Department or a consular office
to give such notice might vitiate the time bar, since the statute man-
dates that the consular office concerned forwarded a copy of the ap-
proved certificate of loss of nationality to the expatriated person. 90
But if a long delay were to occur before filing an appeal, it is un-
likely there would be evidence (beyond the Department's record that
it sent a copy of the certificate to the consular office on a specific
date) to show what disposition was made of the certificate. Whether
the consular officer received the certificate and, if so, whether the
office forwarded it to the party concerned, may not be disclosed by
88. See, e.g., Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950); Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209
(1931); United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953); In re Roney, 139 F.2d
175 (7th Cir. 1943); Dietrich v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 9
F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1926).
89. 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981).
Similarly, Lairsley v. Advance Abrasives Company, 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976)
noted, quoting 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2866, at 228-29 (1982):
What constitutes reasonable time must of necessity depend upon the facts in
each individual case. The courts consider whether the party opposing the mo-
tion has been prejudiced by the delay in seeking relief and they consider
whether the moving party had some good reason for his failure to take appro-
priate action sooner.
90. INA § 358, 8 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982). See supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
extant records. In the absence of evidence to the contrary in such
situations, the presumption is that the officials involved complied
with the law and the office forwarded the certificate to the affected
person."" Passage of many years between performance of the expatri-
ating act and entering an appeal, however, often makes it moot
whether the appellant received a copy of the certificate of loss of
nationality; the facts are probably undiscoverable. In such cases (this
is particularly pertinent where the appellant made a formal renunci-
ation of United States nationality), the relevant inquiry is whether
the appellant had sufficient reason to believe he or she might have
forfeited United States citizenship. If the record establishes this fact,
the Board has concluded the appellant had cause to be put upon
inquiry to ascertain his or her citizenship status and, upon learning
the facts, to initiate timely action to contest the Department's hold-
ing. Failure to act on such knowledge, the Board has held, is inex-
cusable neglect.
9 2
In In re J.F.M. W., appellant made a formal renunciation of his
United States nationality in 1959. He entered an appeal in 1981. He
contended the Department never informed him of his loss of citizen-
ship. The Board found that appellant knew he performed an explicit
act of expatriation. "Thus armed with facts which should have put
him on his guard," the Board said, "W. had a responsibility to ascer-
tain his actual citizenship status, regardless of any alleged lack of
actual notice of the Department's ministerial confirmation of his ex-
patriative act."94
An allegation that one was not informed of the right of appeal
when the holding of loss of nationality was made or did not learn of
the right until many years later is an insufficient reason for a long-
delayed appeal. Prior to 1979 there was no legal requirement to in-
form an expatriate of the right of appeal. Internal Department
guidelines dating from 1954, however, directed consular officers to
inform, in writing, the individual concerned of the right of appeal
when forwarding the approved certificate of loss of nationality to the
91. There is a legal presumption that officials execute their duties faithfully and
correctly, unless the contrary is proven. Webster v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1974);
Boissonnas v. Acheson, 101 F. Supp. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
92. In making this analysis, the Board applies the general rule that the law im-
putes knowledge where opportunity and interest coupled with reasonable care would nec-
essarily impart it. United States v. Shelby Iron Co., 273 U.S. 571 (1926); Nettles v.
Childs, 100 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1939). Knowledge of facts putting a person of ordinary
knowledge on inquiry notice is the equivalent of actual knowledge, and if one has suffi-
cient information to lead him to a fact, he is deemed to be conversant therewith and
laches is chargeable to him if he fails to use the facts putting him on notice. McDonald v.
Robertson, 104 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1939).
93. In re J.F.M.W., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Oct. 25, 1982).
94. Id. at 15-16.
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person.95 In the absence of contrary proof, the Board must assume in
this instance as well that the consular officer properly carried out his
assigned duties. Furthermore, since 1972, certificates of loss of na-
tionality carry information about appeals on the reverse side. Anyone
who received a certificate from 1972 onward may be presumed to
have had notice of the right to appeal.
In any event, due process does not contemplate a right of appeal. 6
While a statutory review is important and must be exercised without
discrimination, such review is not a requirement of due process.9 7 A
fortiori, giving notice of the right of appeal is not a requirement of
due process, unless expressly prescribed by law or regulations.
Recently learning that lack of intent to relinquish citizenship
might be grounds for an appeal is an insufficient reason for delay in
appealing.' An appeal based on such grounds has been available for
nearly twenty years.99 An expatriate, genuinely concerned with re-
covering citizenship, could have learned that fact with due diligence.
To countenance a long delay on grounds of unawareness of readily
ascertainable information would allow one to appeal at a time suita-
ble to oneself, something not contemplated by the rule of reasonable
time.100
Although appellants often concede their delay in appealing was
substantial, they have submitted that the Board should exercise ad-
ministrative discretion and waive the requirements of timely filing
because the merits of the appeal are so compelling and the rights
involved so precious. True, the Board has authority to "take such
[action] as it considers appropriate and necessary to the disposition
of cases appealed to it."101 The Board's authority under this provi-
sion, however, may not be construed so as to nullify other jurisdic-
tional preconditions established by the applicable regulations for the
Board. Once the Board determines it lacks jurisdiction to consider an
95. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
96. District of Columbia v. Calwans, 300 U.S. 617 (1936).
97. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37
(1954).
98. Appellants referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Vance v. Terrazas,
444 U.S. 252 (1979), where the Court held that the government must prove intent to
relinquish citizenship.
99. The Supreme Court's holding in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), to
the effect that Congress has no power to take away citizenship, absent the assent of the
citizen, and the Attorney General's interpretation that a party may always raise the issue
of intent, in 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969), gave an aggrieved party adequate grounds for
seeking review of the determination of loss of his nationality.
100. In re Roney, 139 F,2d 175 (7th Cir. 1943).
101. 22 C.F.R. § 7.2(a) (1979).
appeal as time-barred, the only proper course is to dismiss it.10 2
The principle that a limitation on appeal is, among other things,
intended to protect the opposing party against stale claims is espe-
cially relevant to appeals from determinations of loss of nationality
made prior to 1979. The Department bears the burden of proving a
party's intent to relinquish United States citizenship,10 3 and since it
must prove intent at the time of the expatriating act,104 an appel-
lant's allowing many years to pass before appealing will invariably
prejudice the Department's ability to essay its statutory burden of
proof. With passage of time, memories fade, and notes of consular
officers about the case may have been destroyed. Consular officers
may have died or may no longer be available to testify, or if availa-
ble, they may be unable to remember events of years ago. The De-
partment is thus handicapped in carrying its burden of proof not
only on the issue of intent, but also in meeting allegations that the
appellant performed the expatriating act under duress. 0 5
The Board will docket appeals from determination of loss of na-
tionality made prior to 1979, even though such appeals represent de-
lays of at least six years. As it does in all such cases, the Board will
examine the record closely to determine whether there may be a
valid reason for the appellant's not having moved sooner. Absent a
legally sufficient excuse, the Board will give decisive weight to the
interest in finality and stability of administrative determinations of
loss of nationality.
CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF A DECISION ON THE MERITS
If the jurisdictional prerequisites are met, the Board determines
seriatim: whether the individual validly performed a statutory expa-
triating act; whether it was voluntary; and whether the act was done
with an intent to relinquish United States citizenship.
102. Opinion of Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State (Dec. 27, 1982),
excerpted in 77 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 298 (1983). The Legal Adviser further stated the fact
the Board dismissed an appeal because it is time-barred does not in itself operate as a
bar to the Department's taking further administrative action to correct manifest errors of
fact or law, subject to the general requirements of stability, repose, and finality of admin-
istrative decisions.
103. Vance, 444 U.S. at 252.
104. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981).
105. In re S.B.S., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Apr. 15, 1984), is a singular ex-
ception. There, the delay in entering an appeal was nearly seven years. Nonetheless, the
Board found that the appeal had been taken within a reasonable time. Two salient as-
pects of appellant's case set it apart from others in which the Board had found that
delays of comparable length were unreasonable. There, the Department suffered no
prejudice by the delay, the record was "replete with detailed information" about appel-
lant's intent when she obtained naturalization, and appellant's concern about her loss of
nationality was constant, although her efforts to seek redress were somewhat uneven. Id.
at 9-10.
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Validity of the Expatriative Act
Under the statute, the Department has the burden to prove the
performance of a valid expatriative act.106 To be valid, the individual
must perform the act in accordance with established legal princi-
ples.10 7 Most appellants concede they performed a statutory expatri-
ating act and do not contest its validity.
Occasionally, appellants contend the act they performed is void
because of procedural defects.108  In re M.C.G.109 and In re
C.J.McC.10 are illustrative of this point. In both cases appellants
expatriated themselves by making a formal declaration of allegiance
to Mexico in conjunction with an application for a certificate of
Mexican nationality."' They argued making such a declaration was
invalid because it did not conform with United States legal norms:
they were not formally sworn; the declaration of allegiance contained
no invocation of the deity; it was set out on a pre-printed mimeo-
graphed form; and there was no formal ceremony presided over by a
dignitary. The Board found this line of argument to be without
merit." 2
The Board takes notice that Mexico regards the making of a dec-
laration of allegiance in the form prescribed by its laws as a solemn
and binding undertaking to renounce all other allegiance and adhere
106. INA § 349(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1982), provides that:
Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any action or
proceeding commenced on or after September 26, 1961 under, or by virtue of,
the provisions of this Chapter or any other Act, the burden shall be upon the
person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a
preponderance of the evidence. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b)
of this section, any person who commits or performs, or who has committed or
performed, any act of expatriation under the provisions of this chapter or any
other Act shall be presumed to have done so voluntarily, but such presumption
may be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
act or acts committed or performed were not done voluntarily.
107. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
108. Challenge has also been made to the constitutionality of the applicable section
of the statute or federal regulations. The Board is expressly barred from considering
arguments challenging the constitutionality of any law or any regulation of the Depart-
ment of State. 22 C.F.R. § 7.50) (1985). The same section of the regulations bars the
Board from taking into account any classified or administratively controlled material.
109. In re M.C.G., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. May 10, 1985).
110. In re C.J.Mc.C., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Sept. 6, 1985).
111. INA § 349(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1982), reads as follows:
From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national of the
United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by ....
(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of
allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof . ...
112. In re M.C.G., slip op. at 13-14; In re Matter of C.J.Mc.C., slip op. at 5.
solely to Mexico. Being a meaningful statement of fidelity to Mex-
ico, the declaration satisfies the requirements of the United States
statute. As the district court said in Terrazas v. Vance: "It is the
form of the substantive statement of allegiance to a foreign state as
opposed to the adjectival description of the statement itself which is
determinative and most relevant in deciding matters of ex-
patriation. ' 13
The Board must closely examine the circumstances surrounding
each expatriative act. In no case is careful scrutiny more important
than where one has made a formal renunciation of United States
nationality.1 1 4 Given the gravity of this deliberate act of divestiture
of citizenship, no material deviation is permissible from the provi-
sions of the statute and the guidelines issued by the Secretary of
State to ensure the act is accomplished freely and wittingly.
In In re D.W.L.,'1 5 the Board concluded that appellant did not
make a formal renunciation of his citizenship in conformity with ap-
plicable legal principles, and therefore the act was void ad initio.
There, appellant swore an oath of renunciation before a consular of-
ficer of the United States. The oath was not sworn at a United
States diplomatic or consular office, but at a public safety building in
Winnipeg, Canada, where he was detained pending disposition of
criminal charges against him.
The provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act governing
formal renunciation 16 are identical to those of the Nationality Act
of 1940, which provided the first statutory procedure for formal re-
113. No. 75-C 2370, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1977) (citing III G. HACK-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 219-20 (1942); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491
(1950)). The passage in HACKWORTH cited by the court reads as follows:
The Depatment of State has taken the view that in adopting the provision of
section 2 of the act of March 2, 1907, concerning the taking of an oath of
allegiance to a foreign state, Congress did not have in mind any particular
formula. Secretary Hughes declared in a letter of March 16, 1924 to the Hon-
orable Frank L. Polk:
It is the spirit and meaning of the oath, and not merely the letter, which is to
determine whether it results in expatriation.
It is not a mere matter of words. The test seems to be the question whether
the oath taken places the person taking it in complete subjection to the state to
which it is taken, at least for the period of the contract, so that it is impossible
for him to perform the obligations of citizenship to this country.
114. The statutory provisions for formal renunciation are found in INA §
349(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1982), which reads as follows:
From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national of
the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality
by. ...
(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or con-
sular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of State ....
115. In re D.W.L., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. June 30, 1982).
116. INA § 349(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1982); see supra note 114.
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nunciation of citizenship. 7 Before enactment of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
investigated the immigration and naturalization systems of the
United States. With respect to the statutory procedure of a formal
renunciation in the Nationality Act of 1940, the Committee stated:
"Formal renunciation by a native-born or naturalized citizen abroad
must be made only at a consulate of the United States before diplo-
matic or consular officers.""""
Since the intent of Congress was clear, the Board concluded that
appellant's renunciation was not made in accordance with law be-
cause he made the statement at a place other than a consular estab-
lishment of the United States."' Furthermore, the witnesses to ap-
pellant's renunciation were not in the category of persons who may
witness a formal renunciation; 20 they were Canadian prison officials.
Holding that appellant had not expatriated himself, the Board stated
that the procedural defects surrounding his renunciations were not,
as the Department argued, procedural trivialities. Rather, appellant's
oath was defective because it was not administered in the manner
provided by statute or in the form prescribed by the Secretary of
State.12
Voluntariness
If it is proved that the appellant performed a valid statutory expa-
triating act, the voluntariness of the act is the next issue for determi-
nation. In law, it is presumed that a person who performs a statutory
expatriating act does so voluntarily but this presumption may be re-
117. Section 401(0 of Chapter IV of the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401
(f), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169, reads:
A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by:
(f) Making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or con-
sular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of State ....
118. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 750
(1950). The Committee did not recommend that the statutory procedure of the National-
ity Act of 1940 be changed in the new law.
119. In re D.W.L., State Dep't Dec., slip op. at 9-11 (B. App. R. June 30, 1982).
120. The then-applicable Departmental guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 8 FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Citizenship and Passports § 225.6g (1969) provided: "Witnesses
may be diplomatic or consular officers, local employees, companions of the would-be
renunciant or other private persons who may be available."
121. D.W.L., State Dept Dec., slip op. at 10-11.
butted upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
act was involuntary.
122
If an appellant can show that the act was not freely done because
it was the result of coercion, performed while lacking capacity to
perform a rational act of expatriation, or when appellant was una-
ware of being a United States citizen,123 that is the end of the mat-
ter. "It is settled that no conduct results in expatriation unless the
conduct is engaged in voluntarily.1 2 4
Judicial norms of duress in loss of nationality proceedings come
largely from the plethora of cases spawned in World War II and the
post-war period when many American citizens in Europe and Japan
confronted dangerous or extraordinarily difficult situations which
forced them to perform a proscribed act to protect their own or their
family's lives. Precedents based on human experience in dire situa-
tions many years ago may seem inapposite to the cases of United
States citizens who perform an expatriating act today. Recent court
decisions (with a possible exception discussed below), however, have
not overruled or modified such precedent, and the Board, as a quasi-
judicial administrative panel, is constrained to apply settled case law
in determining duress.
Appellants who seek review of determination of loss of their na-
tionality before the Board have not encountered the stark dilemmas
that faced many plaintiffs in the cases decided in the 1940's and
122. INA § 349(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1982). See supra note 106.
Section 349(c) was enacted in 1961. Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 656 (1961). Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 142 (1958), provided
impetus for its passage. In it, he took issue with the holding of the majority that the
government bore the burden of proving, by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence,
that a voluntary expatriative act had been performed. H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 40 (1961) (House Report on § 349(c)) quoted the Harlan dissent in extenso.
Section 349(c) shifted the burden of proof to the party claiming involuntariness, the
rationale being that since involuntariness is an affirmative defense and the evidence lies
in the possession of the party claiming it, he should bear the burden of proof. At the
same time, the standard of proof was lowered to a preponderance of the evidence.
INA § 349(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (1982) prescribes a conclusive presumption of vol-
untariness, if the party is also a national of the state where the expatriating act was done
and has been physically present in that state for a period of 10 years immediately prior
to commission of the act. The validity of § 349(b) has not been tested in the courts, but
some commentators consider its constitutionality doubtful. See C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
FIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 20.9B (rev. ed. 1979).
The Department's position is it would not be "prudent" to rely on § 349(b) for any
determinations of loss of nationality. Supplemental Memorandum of Law, In re C. deT.,
State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Jan. 29, 1982). In none of its decisions has the Board based
a finding of voluntariness on the provisions of § 349(b).
123. A statutory expatriating act is deemed involuntary if one is unaware of being
a United States citizen when performing the act. Rogers v. Patokoski, 271 F.2d 858 (9th
Cir. 1959).
124. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). See also Vance v. Terrazas: "We
also hold that when one of the statutory expatriating acts is proved, it is constitutional to
presume it to have been voluntary until and unless proved otherwise by the actor. If he
succeeds, there can be no expatriation." 444 U.S. at 270.
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1950's. The duress claimed is usually of a more mundane nature,
and the issue of voluntariness is seldom dispositive. Indeed, it is the
Board's experience that voluntariness is "the over-argued issue. '125
In only two cases in the past four years did the Board find the appel-
lant's claim of duress or incapacity persuasive.126
Nonetheless, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "[W]here a person
who has been declared expatriated contests that declaration on
grounds of duress, the evidence in support of this claim must be sym-
pathetically scrutinized. This is so because of the extreme gravity of
being denationalized and because of the subtle psychological factors
that bear on duress. 1 27
Economic Duress
Economic duress is the most commonly argued defense. Many ap-
pellants contend they were "forced" to jeopardize their citizenship
because only by so doing could they avoid economic hardship or dis-
crimination in employment. For example, a number of teachers al-
leged they had to seek foreign citizenship to retain their positions in
a public school system where untenured (noncitizen) teachers were
vulnerable to dismissal.1 28 Other appellants argued they were obliged
to acquire foreign nationality to enter a profession closed to non-
citizens of the foreign state or even to find any work.1 29
Some degree of economic hardship is present in many cases ap-
pealed to the Board. The decisive issue, however, is whether the pres-
sures to obtain foreign nationality, or to do some other expatriative
act, were sufficiently compelling to render the act involuntary as a
matter of law.
Generally, appellants fail to demonstrate that "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" forced them to commit a proscribed act in the sense
125. Abramson, United States Loss of Citizenship Law after Terrazas: Decisions
of the Board of Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L L. AND PoL. 850, 853 (1984).
Abramson argues that since the government must prove a person's intent to relinquish
citizenship, "this would be a better issue for an appellant to rely on in his defense." His
article is an excellent survey of the Board's decisions after Terrazas.
126. In re H.H.L., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Aug. 8, 1985); In re G.B.S., State
Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 14, 1983).
127. Nishikawa, 356 U.S. at 140 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also
Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 11, 13 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ("[tlhe means of exercising
duress is not limited to guns, clubs, or physical threats").
128. See e.g., In re R.H.M., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Dec. 13, 1985), In re
C.A.P.O., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 29, 1985); In re M.R., State Dep't Dec. (B.
App. R. Nov. 17, 1983).
129. See e.g., In re R.J.C., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Mar. 20, 1985); In re
M.F.P., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Feb. 24, 1983).
envisaged by the court in Doreau v. Marshall.30 There, the peti-
tioner claimed she obtained French naturalization during the Ger-
man occupation to avoid internment, fearing that internment would
endanger her life and the life of her unborn child. "If by reason of
extraordinary circumstances amounting to true duress," the court
said, "an American citizen is forced into the formalities of citizen-
ship of another country, the sine qua non of expatriation is lack-
ing." 13' The court noted, however, that foresaking American citizen-
ship as a matter of expediency, when "crass material considerations
suggest that course," does not constitute duress.
13 2
In the Board's experience the degree of economic compulsion
pleaded is not on the order of severity that the courts hold must exist
for such a defense to prevail. No appellant, recently at least, has met
the stringent tests laid down in Stipa v. Dulles'3 3 and Insogna v.
Dulles.34 Where petitioners performed an expatriative act in the ec-
onomic chaos of wartime and postwar Italy to subsist, appellants
coming before the Board are unable to show dire economic circum-
stances that forced them to perform a proscribed act.
In the recent case of Richards v. Secretary of State, 3 5 plaintiff
argued he obtained naturalization in Canada to retain his employ-
ment. The district court found, however, that he was under no eco-
nomic hardship. Affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit
stated:
Conditions of economic duress, however, have been found under circum-
stances far different from those prevailing here. In Insogna v. Dulles, for
instance, the expatriating act was performed to obtain money necessary "in
order to live." In Stipa v. Dulles, the alleged expatriate faced "dire eco-
nomic plight and inability to obtain employment." Although we do not de-
cide that economic duress exists only under such extreme circumstances, we
do think that, at the least, some degree of hardship must be shown.1 36
Although it is arguable that Richards qualifies the current perti-
nence of Stipa and Insogna, it is important to note that the Ninth
Circuit was only required to determine whether the district court
erred in finding that Richards was under no economic hardship, and
it held the lower court did not err. Plainly, an individual must prove
more than ordinary hardship to sustain a defense of economic duress.
130. 170 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1948).
131. Id. at 724. See also Schioler v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill.
1948). Petitioner obtained Danish naturalization to protect herself, her husband, and her
children during the German occupation.
132. 170 F.2d at 724.
133. Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1956) (individual faced "dire economic
plight and inability to obtain employment").
134. 116 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1953) (expatriating act performed to obtain money
necessary to live).
135. 752 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1985).
136. Id. at 1419.
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Appellants pleading economic duress have not been able to estab-
lish that they had no alternative to performing the act, or that they
made a bona fide effort to protect their economic position by means
short of jeopardizing their United States citizenship, but failed.
Where one has a clear alternative to performance of an expatriating
act or fails to prove that alternatives were explored but to no avail,
the Board has concluded that the individual has an opportunity to
make a personal choice. 1 7 Neither motivation nor the difficulty of
the choice makes an action involuntary if the actor is free to choose
between alternatives.138 "The opportunity to make a decision based
upon personal choice is the essence of voluntariness." 13 9 In brief, in
today's world a plea of economic duress rarely will be a persuasive
defense.
Family Devotion
In In re K.L.D.,140 subtle psychological factors purportedly caused
appellant to perform a statutory expatriating act. Appellant, wife of
a leading provincial politician, allegedly obtained naturalization in
Canada to protect her husband's public career at a time when the
press and political circles were highly critical of her non-Canadian
citizenship. Only the detrimental effect of this criticism on her hus-
band's political fortunes, and on her children, who were subjected to
growing public exposure, led her to take Canadian citizenship.
The Board accepted that the pressures appellant felt were genuine.
Nonetheless, it could not consider them coercive as a matter of law.
The circumstances under which she obtained naturalization were not
"extraordinary." Appellant was in a sense the author of her own dif-
ficulty; she married when her husband was already prominent in
politics, and might have been expected to foresee that her lack of
Canadian citizenship could one day create problems for his career.
Furthermore, both appellant and her husband conceded that their
marriage would probably not have suffered had she not obtained
naturalization. 41
Nor was appellant's situation remotely comparable to that of the
137. In re T.S., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Jan. 23, 1986); In re C.I.B., State
Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Nov. 25, 1985).
138. Prieto v. United States, 289 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1961); Jubran v. United States,
255 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1958).
139. Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946
(1971).
140. In re K.L.D., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Oct. 16, 1985).
141. Id. at 10.
plaintiffs in Mendelsohn v. Dulles,142 or Ryckman v. Acheson.143 In
those cases, a husband (Mendelsohn) and a daughter (Ryckman),
both naturalized United States citizens, remained abroad in excess
of the time permissible for naturalized citizens under the then-appli-
cable law. The purpose of each individual's extended stay abroad
was to care for a seriously ill wife and terminally ill mother, respec-
tively, for whom there was no one else to minister. The courts found
the devotion of both plaintiffs was just as compelling as physical
restraint.144
A case of first impression: In re K.L.D. presented duress in an
elusive form. Although appellant's situation evoked its sympathy, the
Board was constrained to follow settled precedent, and thus con-
cluded that she voluntarily performed the expatriating act.
Duress and Formal Renunciation of United States Nationality
In cases of formal renunciation of United States nationality, the
issue of voluntariness may be crucial. Unless the appellant can prove
involuntariness, he or she is unlikely to prevail; the categoric lan-
guage of the formal oath of renunciation seldom leaves any doubt
the appellant intended to relinquish citizenship.
One appellant argued that she joined her husband in making a
formal renunciation because he exerted pressure on her to do so; she
thus acted because of marital devotion and the influence of an-
other.1 45 When she renounced, appellant was pregnant and sole fi-
nancial support for the family. Her contention that she acted invol-
untarily because she was particularly vulnerable at the time was
plausible. However, she submitted no evidence to support her claim,
save a latter-day statement from her husband. The Board could not
accept her unsubstantiated, after-the-event allegations of duress in
the face of clear language of the oath of renunciation and the state-
ment of understanding she executed in the presence of the consul in
which she attested that she had renounced her citizenship freely and
not under the compulsion or influence of another.
1 46
Appellant in In re G.B.S.1 47 was a schizophrenic, with a history of
attempted suicide and dissolute habits. The consul who administered
the oath of allegiance to appellant reported to the Department that
the appellant appeared competent when he renounced his citizenship,
and the record showed he managed his business affairs fairly effi-
ciently. He argued, however, that he was not mentally competent to
142. 207 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
143. 106 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
144. Mendelsohn, 207 F.2d at 39; Ryckman, 106 F. Supp. at 741-42.
145. In re E.M.H., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Aug. 25, 1982).
146. Id. at 16-17.
147. In re G.B.S., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 14, 1983).
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perform a voluntary act of expatriation on the day of his renuncia-
tion. The psychiatrist in whose care appellant was under for a year
prior to his reunuciation and who examined appellant only one week
before he renounced, stated without any reservation in a sworn state-
ment that his patient was incapable of performing a rational act on
the day he gave up his citizenship. On the basis of the unequivocal
evidence of an eminent practitioner with forty years experience, the
Board concluded that appellant rebutted the statutory presumption
of voluntariness.
14 8
In In re H.H.L.,'4 9 appellant, a dual national of the United States
and Saudi Arabia, renounced his United States nationality in Jidda
when he was sixteen years old, allegedly because he was forced to do
so by his father.150 In concluding appellant rebutted the statutory
presumption of voluntariness, the Board gave great weight to the
fact appellant was a minor when he renounced. It reasoned that an
ostensibly devout Muslim child, living in a state where the Koran is
law, probably would have lacked the will to resist the dictates of a
forceful father who, the record showed, was adamant his son not
hold two citizenships.1
51
Intent to Relinquish United States Citizenship-the Constitutional
Dimension
Even though an appellant fails to rebut the statutory presumption
of voluntariness, the question remains whether the government satis-
fies its burden of proof that the individual performed the expatriat-
ing act with the intention of relinquishing citizenship.1 52
148. Id. at 13-14.
149. In re H.H.L., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Aug. 8, 1985).
150. Under the statute, a person under the age of 18 may legally renounce United
States nationality. See infra note 268.
151. H.H.L., slip op. at 20-21. Although there was a five year delay in taking the
appeal, the Board found that it had been entered within a reasonable time after the
Department's holding of loss of appellant's nationality. The appellant made a showing
that he could not move sooner, because his father restrained him from taking any action
to contest the loss of his citizenship.
The Board's disposition of the appeal was somewhat novel. The appellant alleged that
the same coercive factors that caused his renunciation remained in effect until shortly
before he filed the appeal. The Board was persuaded that the issues of timeliness and
voluntariness were so linked that it would be difficult to evaluate his reason for the delay
without simultaneously inquiring into the causes of his renunciation.
152. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 264-70 (1980), clarifying Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967).
The Judicial Setting
Before Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court rejected any conten-
tion that the power of Congress to regulate loss of nationality de-
pended on the assent of the citizen. In Perez v. Brownell,153 a nar-
rowly divided Court (5 to 4) affirmed a line of decisions holding
intent was irrelevant in loss of nationality proceedings. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who wrote for the majority, grounded the Court's deci-
sion firmly on stare decisis: "Of course, Congress can attach loss of
citizenship only as a consequence of conduct engaged in voluntarily
... .But it would be a mockery of this Court's decisions to suggest
that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire
to do So.
' 154
Chief Justice Warren took strong issue with the majority view,
maintaining that the government is without power to take away citi-
zenship. The fourteenth amendment, he asserted, "recognizes that
this priceless right is immune from the exercise of governmental
powers ...every exercise of governmental power must find its
source in the Constitution. The power to denationalize is not within
the letter or the spirit of the powers with which our Government was
endowed." 1 5
A number of cases later decided by the Court and a number of
commentators raised serious doubts about the soundness of Perez.156
Nearly ten years passed, however, before the Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of whether loss of nationality depended on a
party's intent to relinquish citizenship. Afroyim v. Rusk presented
the opportunity to do so. There, the petitioner instituted an action
for a declaratory judgment after the Board of Review on the Loss of
Nationality of the Department of State affirmed the Department's
determination that Afroyim expatriated himself by voting in an elec-
tion in Israel.15 7 The lower courts rejected petitioner's argument that
he could only lose his citizenship if he intended to relinquish it.
A new majority (Afroyim, too, was a 5 to 4 decision) adopted the
basic premise of the Chief Justice's dissent in Perez. Speaking for
the Court, Mr. Justice Black said: "[W]e reject the idea expressed in
Perez that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has
any general power, express or implied, to take away an American
153. 356 U.S. 44 (1957).
The petitioner lost his citizenship under Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(e), 54
Stat. 1137, 1168, by voting in an election in Mexico. The Court dismissed the petitioner's
contention that § 401(e) was unconstitutional because it was beyond the power of Con-
gress to enact the provision.
154. 356 U.S. at 61.
155. Id. at 77-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
156. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 255-56.
157. Like Perez, Afroyim lost his citizenship under Nationality Act of 1940, ch.
876, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1137, 1168. See supra note 153.
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citizen's citizenship without his assent.1 158 He concluded the Consti-
tution protects the right of an individual to remain a United States
citizen unless the person voluntarily relinquishes his citizenship.159
The Court overruled Perez and declared the statutory proscription
on voting in a foreign election unconstitutional.1 60
Although a watershed in nationality law, Afroyim was not a
model of clarity. It did not expressly define voluntary relinquish-
ment,16 1 nor did it allocate the burden or establish the standard of
proof that a citizen has assented to loss of his United States citizen-
ship. The Departments of State and Justice therefore consulted for
over a year to determine how the administrative authorities should
apply Afroyim to specific loss of nationality statutes. The result of
those consultations was the Attorney General's Statement of Inter-
pretation of Afroyim, issued January 18, 1969.16 12 Afroyim makes it
clear, the Attorney General said:
that an act which does not reasonably manifest an individual's transfer or
abandonment of allegiance to the United States cannot be the basis for ex-
patriation .... I have concluded that it is the duty of executive officials to
apply the act on the following basis. "Voluntary relinquishment" of citizen-
ship is not confined to a written renunciation .... It can also be mani-
fested by other actions declared expatriative under the act, if such actions
are derogation of allegiance to this country. Yet even in those cases,
Afroyim leaves it open to the individual to raise the issue of intent.183
Once the issue of intent is raised, he said, the government has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that expatria-
tion took place.6 4 Citing Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in
Nishikawa v. Dulles,'65 the Attorney General stated that the volun-
158. 387 U.S. at 257.
159. Id. at 267-68.
160. In invalidating § 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, the Court ipso facto
invalidated § 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See supra note 72.
161. Mr. Justice Harlan, who dissented, pointed out an ambiguity in the majority's
opinion.
[I]t has assumed that voluntariness is here a term of fixed meaning; in fact, of
course, it has been employed to describe both a specific intent to renounce citi-
zenship, and the uncoerced commission of an act conclusively deemed by law to
be a relinquishment of citizenship. Until the Court indicates with greater preci-
sion what it means by "assent" today's opinion will surely cause still greater
confusion in this area of the law.
387 U.S. at 269 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
162. Attorney General's Statement of Interpretation Concerning Expatriation of
United States Citizens, 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969).
163. Id. at 400.
164. Id. The Attorney General noted that the government's burden is clear under §
349(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See supra note 106.
165. 356 U.S. 129, 138 (1958).
tary performance of some acts may be highly persuasive evidence of
intent to abandon citizenship, adding, "[y]et some kinds of conduct
though within the prescription of the statute, simply will not be suffi-
ciently probative to support a finding of voluntary expatriation.
1 6 6
He concluded that in each case the administrative authorities must
make a judgment, based on all the evidence, whether the individual
comes within the term of an expatriation provision and has in fact
voluntarily relinquished his citizenship.
16 7
Under the Attorney General's advice, the Department and the
INS adopted the following general principles to guide the adminis-
trative authorities in loss of nationality proceedings:
The voluntary performance of the following acts is considered highly per-
suasive evidence of an intention to relinquish citizenship and will normally
result in expatriation:
(1) Naturalization in a foreign state
(2) A meaningful oath of allegiance to a foreign state
(3) Service in the Armed Forces of a state engaged in hostilities against the
United States
(4) Service in an important political post in a foreign government.
In all cases the person who performed an act described as expatriative by
statute should be given, to the extent possible, an opportunity to state fully
all of the facts and circumstances, and the motives and purposes surround-
ing the expatriative act he performed with emphasis on ascertaining his in-
tent to relinquish such act."'8
In 1977 the Department's guidelines for consular and Departmen-
tal officers spelled out specific indicia of intent to relinquish citizen-
ship.1 69 Among the factors to assess in potential loss of nationality
cases were whether one: registered with the authorities of the foreign
country of his residence as an alien or as a citizen of that foreign
country; held documents issued by the foreign country; registered or
otherwise was documented as a United States citizen; documented
one's children United States citizens; consulted a United States offi-
cial about the effect of performing the expatriative act in question;
tried to avoid performance of the expatriative act. After Afroyim
and the Attorney General's interpretation, the courts consistently ad-
dressed the issue of intent, assuming intent was a required element
in expatriation.70
166. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. at 400.
167. Id. at 401.
168. The principles were set out in an instruction to all diplomatic and consular
posts. Circular Airgram 2855 (May 16, 1969). They were incorporated in the Depart-
ment's Foreign Affairs Manual in 1970. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN-
UAL, Citizenship and Passports § 224.5 (1970).
169. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Citizenship and Pass-
ports § 224.20c (1977).
170. See Baker v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Jolley v. INS, 441
F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971); King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir. 1972); Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972); United
States v. Matheson, 400 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.),
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In 1980 the Supreme Court revisited Afroyim in Vance v. Ter-
razas.11 1 The litigation began after the Board of Appellate Review
had affirmed the Department's holding that Terrazas voluntarily
swore allegiance to Mexico with the intention of abandoning his
United States citizenship. In its opinion the Board stated: "We view
appellant's declaration of allegiance to Mexico and his concurrent
repudiation of any and all submission, obedience, and loyalty to the
United States as compelling evidence of a specific intent to relin-
quish his United States citizenship."
17 2
Terrazas instituted an action in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois for a judgment declaring him to
be a United States citizen. After the district court held that Terrazas
"voluntarily relinquished" his United States citizenship,173 he ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh
Circuit ruled that the fourth amendment to the Constitution requires
the government to prove expatriation by clear and convincing evi-
dence, not by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, it de-
clared the statutory standard of proof unconstitutional,'174 and re-
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
decision.17 5 The government meanwhile petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari which the Court granted in view of the
constitutional issue presented. The Supreme Court did not decide the
merits of the case; its decision allocated the burden of proof and set
the standard of proof in loss of nationality proceedings.
Clarifying and elaborating its opinion in Afroyim, the Court said:
"[t]he trier of fact must in the end conclude that the citizen not only
voluntarily committed the expatriating act prescribed in the statute,
but also intended to relinquish citizenship."' 7 6 "This understanding
of Afroyim," the Court continued, "is little different from that ex-
pressed by the Attorney General in his 1969 opinion explaining the
impact of that case."' 77 After quoting extensively from the Attorney
General's opinion, the Court said: "it was under this advice, as the
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Davis v. INS, 481 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1979).
171. 444 U.S. 252 (1980). Terrazas expatriated himself under § 349(a)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act by making a formal declaration of allegiance to Mex-
ico. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
172. In re Lawrence J. Terrazas, State Dep't Dec., slip op. at 13 (B. App. R. Apr.
29, 1975).
173. Terrazas v. Vance, No. 75C-2370 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1977).
174. INA § 349(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1982). See supra note 106.
175. Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978).
176. 444 U.S. at 261.
177. Id.
Secretary concedes, that the relevant departments of the Govern-
ment have applied the statute and the Constitution to require an ul-
timate finding of an intent to expatriate." 17 8
Intent, the Court said, may be expressed in words or found as a
fair inference from proven conduct.1 9 With respect to the burden
and standard of proof, the Court held constitutional the statutory
provision requiring the government to prove intent by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
180
Reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the Court re-
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision.
On remand, the district court again held against Terrazas. 81 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
1 2
After Terrazas, the Department of State amplified its post-
Afroyim guidelines for determining intent.183 Indicia of intent to re-
tain citizenship include the following: ties to the United States; per-
formance of the rights and duties of United States citizen-
ship-voting, filing and paying income taxes; obtaining and
maintaining documentation for oneself and one's children as Ameri-
can citizens. Indicia of intent to relinquish citizenship include the
following: use of a foreign passport; taking part in the political life of
the foreign state; and not doing the things listed above as indicating
178. Id. at 262. The Court observed that:
As the Secretary states in his brief, 'both the State Department and the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service have adopted administrative guidelines that
attempt to ascertain the individual's intent by taking into consideration the
nature of the expatriating act and the individual's statements and actions made
in connection with that act.'
The State Department's guideline evidences a position on intent quite similar to that
adopted here:
In the light of the Afroylm decision and the Attorney General's Statement of
Interpretation of that decision, the Department now holds that the taking of a
meaningful oath of allegiance to a foreign state is highly persuasive evidence of
an intent to transfer or abandon allegiance. The taking of an oath that is not
meaningful does not result in expatriation. The meaningfulness of the oath
must be decided by the Department on the individual merits of each case.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 224.2, at 2 (1970) (emphasis in
original).
179. 444 U.S. at 260.
180. Id. at 267.
The Supreme Court was "in fundamental disagreement" with the holding of the Sev-
enth Circuit to the effect that Congress is without constitutional authority to prescribe
the standard of proof in expatriation proceedings and that the proof must be by clear and
convincing evidence. Proving intent is in itself a heavy burden, the Court said, and "we
cannot hold that Congress exceeded its powers by requiring proof of an intentional expa-
triating act by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
181. Terrazas v. Muskie, 494 F. Supp. 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
182. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981).
183. The 1980 guidelines were set out in Circular Airgram No. 1767 (Aug. 27,
1980), to all diplomatic and consular posts. They have been written into the latest edition
of the Foreign Affairs Manual. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL,
Consular Affairs § 1218 (1984).
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an intent to retain citizenship.
Except for the Department's guideline that the making of a mean-
ingful oath of allegiance to a foreign state may be highly persuasive
evidence of an intent to relinquish citizenship (noted with approval
by the Supreme Court in Terrazas), the courts have yet to review
the Department's guidelines for determining a person's intent.
At the end of the litigation in Terrazas, the Seventh Circuit em-
phasized that the intent the government must prove is the party's
intent at the time the expatriative act is done. The court also ampli-
fied the Supreme Court's rule that intent may be expressed in words
or found as a fair inference from proven conduct: "A party's specific
intent rarely will be established by direct evidence, but circumstan-
tial evidence surrounding commission of a voluntary act of expatria-
tion may establish the requisite intent to relinquish citizenship.
18 4
Credible, direct evidence dating from the time of the performance
of the expatriative act is the most probative. In some appeals there is
compelling contemporary, or nearly contemporary, evidence of a
party's intent. Formal renunciation of United States citizenship is
the most obvious. Renouncing allegiance to the United States in con-
junction with the performance of some other expatriative act may
also show intent. On the other hand, appellants occasionally submit
persuasive evidence indicative of intent to retain citizenship at the
critical moment; such instances, however, tend to be exceptional.
In many appeals, there is no decisive evidence of a person's intent
at the performance of the proscribed act. In such cases, proven con-
duct subsequent to commission of the expatriative act must therefore
be the primary focus of inquiry.
Applying Judicial Standards
In the last four years, the Department of State has made on the
average slightly more than 1000 annual determinations of loss of na-
tionality. 1 5 Obtaining naturalization in a foreign state is the basis of
well over half of those determinations."86 So it is hardly surprising
184. 653 F.2d at 288.
185. Information provided by the Office of Citizen's Consular Services, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, Dep't of State. This office has delegated authority to make determina-
tion of nationality. The statistics show a downward trend in the total number of determi-
nations of loss of nationality from 1579 in fiscal year 1981 to 975 in fiscal year 1984.
186. INA § 349(a)(1), 8 U.SC. § 1481(a)(1) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national of the
United States whether by birth or naturalization shall lose his nationality by ....
(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application, upon
that most appeals taken to the Board are from determinations of loss
of nationality through naturalization in a foreign state. For example,
from March 1982 through December 1984, nearly eighty appeals
were taken from determinations of loss of nationality made on those
grounds. 87
For purposes of analysis one must distinguish between two types
of appeals from determinations of loss of nationality through foreign
naturalization: (a) those where a United States citizen obtained nat-
uralization in a foreign state that does not require the applicant to
renounce his nationality of origin upon swearing another allegiance
to the foreign state; and (b) those where the foreign state demands
that applicants for naturalization expressly renounce previous alle-
giance incident to pledging allegiance to the state where citizenship
is sought. 188
an application filed in his behalf by a parent, guardian, or duly authorized
agent, or through the naturalization of a parent having legal custody of such
person: Provided, That (sic) nationality shall not be lost by any person under
this section as the result of the naturalization of a parent or parents while such
person is under the age of twenty-one years, or as the result of a naturalization
obtained on behalf of a person under twenty-one years of age by a parent,
guardian, or duly authorized agent, unless such person shall fail to enter the
United States to establish a permanent residence prior to his twenty-fifth birth-
day ....
Obtaining the nationality of a foreign country by operation of law, i.e., by virtue of
birth to a United States citizen parent in a foreign country, or birth in the United States
to foreign citizen parents is not expatriative. INA § 101(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(23)
(1982), defines naturalization as "the conferring of nationality of a state upon a person
after birth, by any means whatsoever." (emphasis added).
An American citizen may also acquire the nationality of a foreign state automatically,
by operation of a law that grants its nationality to certain classes of foreigners who move
to the country to reside permanently. The prime example is Israel. Under the Law of
Return, 4 L.S.I. 114 (1950), any Jew who is granted permission to immigrate to Israel
automatically acquires Israeli citizenship, unless he or she opts out within a limited pe-
riod of time after arrival. The Department of State does not consider such an acquisition
of foreign nationality to be expatriative, whereas obtaining naturalization in Israel (or
any foreign state) upon one's own application is so considered. 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN-
UAL § 1261(a) (1984).
Acquisition of foreign nationality by an American woman through marriage to a citi-
zen of a foreign state, whose laws grant citizenship automatically on the basis of mar-
riage, is not, without more, expatriative. See Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp.
1035 (D.D.C. 1972).
187. Of the 78 decisions rendered from 1982 through 1984 involving naturalization
in a foreign state, the Board affirmed the Department's determination of loss of national-
ity in 15; reversed the Department in 19; remanded 18 at the request of the Department
for the purpose of vacating the certificate of loss of nationality; and dismissed 26 as not
timely filed.
188. The distinction is crucial, as the District Court pointed out in Richards v.
Secretary of State, No. CV80-4150, slip op. at 5 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
Within the context of voluntary oaths of allegiance to another country as evi-
dence of one's intent voluntarily to relinquish United States citizenship, we
must differentiate between a "dramatic" oath and a "dull" oath. A "dramatic"
oath is one which contains both an express affirmation of loyalty to the country
whose citizenship is sought and an express renunciation of loyalty to the coun-
try in which citizenship has been maintained. A "dull" oath contains only the
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Naturalization in a Foreign State with only Oath of
Allegiance
Some of the most vexing cases that come before the Board involve
naturalization in a foreign state that does not require renunciation of
previous allegiance or citizenship.189 The difficulty in reaching com-
fortable decisions in such cases arises in part because of the "great
variety of ambiguous circumstances in which naturalization can and
does occur, and the fact that many citizens are still unaware of the
legal consequences of voluntarily obtaining foreign naturalization
"190
A further difficulty arises from the fact that rarely in this type of
case is there direct contemporary evidence of the citizen's intent,
save performance of the expatriative act and the making of an oath
of allegiance to a foreign state. But obtaining foreign naturalization
or any one of the statutory expatriating acts is not conclusive evi-
dence of an intent to relinquish citizenship, although it may be per-
suasive evidence of such intent.191 Evidence of intent must therefore
usually be sought in a party's words or conduct after naturalization.
The pertinent inquiry is whether later statements and actions are
more likely than not a fair representation of the individual's will and
purpose when naturalization was obtained. In making an a posteriori
determination of a citizen's intent, the trier of fact must be satisfied
that the individual's conduct is free from ambiguities.
In Baumgartner v. United States,192 the Court pointed out the evi-
dentiary uncertainties of relating back words or conduct to deter-
mine intent at a given moment in time. There, the United States
brought an action to set aside plaintiff's naturalization on the
grounds that plaintiff did not intend to support the Constitution
former, leaving ambiguous the intent of the utterer regarding his present na-
tionality. The taking of a "dramatic" oath of allegiance to another country by
an American citizen effectively works a renunciation of American citizenship,
because it evidences an intent by the citizen to so renounce. Id. (citation
omitted).
189. Canada, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the United
Kingdom are leading examples. The Netherlands and Norway, in fact, do not require the
making of an oath of allegiance. Before 1973 Canadian Citizenship Regulations required
applicants for naturalization to renounce all previous allegiance. See infra note 234.
190. Duvall, Expatriation Under United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The
Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REv. 408, 435 (1970), is a
comprehensive treatise on citizenship and loss of citizenship by a former member of the
Board of Review on the Loss of Nationality, the predecessor of Board of Appellate Re-
view. Duvall's article is still pertinent 16 years later.
191. 444 U.S. at 261.
192. 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
when he swore an oath of allegiance to the United States ten years
before. Holding the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charge
that appellant did not intend to support the Constitution, the Court
stated:
For Baumgartner professed loyalty at the trial, denied or explained the few
disturbing statements attributed to him by others, and reconciled suspicious
diary entries in ways that do not preclude the validity of his oath of alle-
giance. In short, the weakness of the proof as to Baumgartner's state of
mind at the time he took the oath of allegiance can be removed, if at all,
only by a presumption that disqualifying views expressed after naturaliza-
tion were accurate representations of his views when he took the oath. The
logical validity of such a presumption is at best dubious even were the sup-
porting evidence less rhetorical and more conclusive.1 93
Specific judicial criteria for determining intent to relinquish citi-
zenship in this particular area of nationality law are sparse, although
there are some benchmarks in addition to the general guidelines the
Supreme Court laid down in Terrazas.
In asserting that circumstantial evidence may reveal a party's in-
tent to relinquish citizenship, the Seventh Circuit in Terrazas v.
Haig94 cited an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, King v. Rogers.1"5
The Secretary of State may prove intent, the court stated in King,
by: "evidence of an explicit renunciation, acts inconsistent with
United States citizenship, or by 'affirmative voluntary act[s] clearly
manifesting a decision to accept [foreign] nationality .. " 19
In determining the intent of a person who obtains foreign naturali-
zation without making a renunciatory declaration, only one of the
above tests is, of course, relevant--"acts inconsistent with United
States citizenship. '97
King and Baker v. Rusk' 98 are instructive for the light they shed
on conduct that may prove intent. In Baker, plaintiff made an oath
of allegiance upon admission to the bar in Canada to King George V
as symbolic head of the Canadian legal system, but did not acknowl-
193. Id. at 676-77.
194. 653 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1981).
195. 463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972).
196. Id. at 1189.
197. The Ninth Circuit cited In re Balsamo, 306 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
for the proposition that affirmative voluntary acts showing a decision to accept foreign
nationality may evidence intent. There, a naturalized United States citizen reacquired his
Italian nationality of birth by operation of law after having lived there for many years.
The court concluded that he did not intend to relinquish United States citizenship, be-
cause he performed no voluntary act clearly manifesting a decision to acquire Italian
nationality. It would be illogical to assert that one who voluntarily obtains naturalization
in a foreign state does not intend to acquire the nationality of that country; the party's
intent to relinquish or retain United States nationality, however, remains to be
determined.
198. 296 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (cited by court in King for the proposi-
tion that acts inconsistent with U.S. citizenship may evidence renunciatory intent).
[VOL. 23: 261, 1986] Loss of Nationality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
edge the King as his national sovereign. 199 The court found that
plaintiff did not intend to relinquish United States citizenship, rea-
soning that:
after taking the oath, [plaintiff] did not at any time consider himself to be a
citizen of Canada. He did not vote in any election in that country and,
apart from the matter of the oath, there is no indication that he made any
expression or performed any act that might be considered inconsistent with
United States citizenship.200
Plaintiff in King obtained naturalization in the United Kingdom.
Although the court held that plaintiff's oath of allegiance to the Brit-
ish Crown incident to naturalization was in itself insufficient evi-
dence of an intent to relinquish United States citizenship, the court
characterized it as substantial evidence of such intent. Furthermore,
the court noted that after naturalization plaintiff made his intent
clear by informing both his draft board and United States consular
officials that he no longer considered himself to be an American citi-
zen. Such statements, the court said, indicated that while King never
formally renounced his United States citizenship, he intended to do
so when he became a British subject.
20 1
Evidence of intent to relinquish United States citizenship as un-
ambiguous as that in King v. Rogers is rare in the Board's experi-
ence; a party's intent must invariably be gauged by conduct (and
words) that are far less explicit.
What conduct will support a finding of intent to relinquish United
States citizenship? After obtaining foreign naturalization a party
may enter the armed forces of the foreign state; or formally hold
him or herself out exclusively as a citizen of that country; obtain and
use that country's passport to the exclusion of the United States
passport; or take an active role in the political life of the foreign
state, beyond merely voting occasionally. Performance of any of
those acts is, on its face, inconsistent with United States citizenship,
as suggested in Baker. Nonetheless, the Board must examine care-
fully all the circumstances of the case to determine whether mitigat-
ing considerations might exist, giving rise to material doubt about
the party's specific intent. It may be pertinent to inquire whether
there is a basis for an allegation that an appellant believed it legally
199. The Department held that the plaintiff lost his United States citizenship
under of the Act of March 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 193, 34 Stat. 1228, which provided that
a citizen who took an oath of allegiance to a foreign state shall be deemed to have expa-
triated himself.
200. 296 F. Supp. at 1246.
201. 463 F.2d at 1190.
possible to hold two citizenships and thus to exercise citizenship
rights of the foreign country in that country without jeopardizing
United States citizenship.
More difficult judgmental problems are presented in cases where
an appellant has done no act (beyond obtaining foreign naturaliza-
tion) that is inconsistent with United States citizenship. For exam-
ple, a person may have sought no tangible benefit from naturaliza-
tion except perhaps the right to enter certain kinds of employment.
He or she may, however, have failed to discharge or exercise the
duties and rights of United States citizenship after obtaining foreign
citizenship. Such conduct obviously shows little respect for one's ob-
ligations toward the United States, but query whether it sufficiently
manifests an intent to relinquish United States citizenship. What
weight should be given to such variables as: inertia, lack of knowl-
edge, or a belief that because one lives in a friendly foreign environ-
ment no need was perceived to seek advice, assistance or documenta-
tion from United States authorities? How pertinent is the fact that
one may have been taken to a foreign country at a tender age, grown
up and been educated there, never having had close ties to the
United States or been educated in the responsibilities of United
States citizenship? Is it relevant that many American citizens living
in the United States are also negligent in observing their civic
duties?
If one obtains foreign naturalization and continues to discharge
the obligations of citizenship, a strong case of intent to retain citi-
zenship may be made. But the converse does not unerringly indicate
an intent to abandon United States citizenship. "Citizenship is not
lost everytime a duty of citizenship is shirked."2 °2
A review of some representative decisions will illustrate how the
Board has decided the issue of a citizen's intent to relinquish United
States citizenship in a variety of factual settings. Since most cases
appealed to the Board involved naturalization in Canada, the follow-
ing selection draws heavily on the Canadian experience. But first, an
observation of general applicability is in order.
In loss of nationality proceedings it is axiomatic that an adequate
evidentiary record is indispensable if the Board is to reach a just
decision. In no such proceeding is a good record more essential than
in the case of one who obtained naturalization in a foreign state that
does not require renunciation of previous nationality.
The responsibility to develop a full record on the issue of intent
rests on consular officers who, since Afroyim, have been under ex-
plicit Departmental instructions to do S0.203 If a consular officer has
202. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958).
203. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 224.20(2) (1970); Cir-
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not adequately explored and assessed an appellant's intent, the
Board has found such a lapse grounds for reversing the Depart-
ment's determination of loss of the person's citizenship.
In In re A.K.S.,2°0 appellant obtained naturalization in Norway.
The only documentation the consular officer submitted to the De-
partment to support the certificate of loss of nationality he had exe-
cuted was a statement of the Norwegian authorities attesting that
appellant had become naturalized and a questionnaire to facilitate
determination of United States citizenship which appellant had com-
pleted in evident confusion about its significance. Although the rec-
ord showed there was ample reason for the consular officer to de-
velop the issue of appellant's intent carefully, he did not do so. The
result was a meager record. In reversing the Department's determi-
nation of loss of appellant's citizenship, the Board observed that
where such a vital right is at stake, the Board was not prepared to
accept a scant evidentiary record as a sufficient basis to confirm the
holding of loss of appellant's nationality; reaching a fair decision is
often hard enough when the record has been fully developed and am-
ple evidence has been presented. 0 5
In re H.106 involved a diversity of factors that may bear on intent.
Appellant married a British subject in Canada in 1963, and through
marriage acquired the right to become a British subject simply by
registering with the British High Commission; this she did in 1965.
For the next sixteen years appellant lived in Canada and the United
Kingdom, travelling abroad and to the United States on a British
passport. She voted in British elections, and neither filed United
States income tax returns nor paid United States income taxes, ap-
parently having no income taxable in the United States. She did not
consult United States officials about her citizenship status for many
years until she inquired about an immigration visa for her husband
to enter the United States.
On appeal from the Department's determination she expatriated
herself by registering as a British subject; appellant maintained she
never intended to relinquish United States citizenship. She believed
registering was not an act of naturalization (which it legally was)
but an act of registering dual citizenship rights acquired by
cular Airgram 1767 (Aug. 27, 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN-
UAL § 1217 (1984).
204. In re A.K.S., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Sept. 25, 1984).
205. Id. at 15.
206. In re H., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Mar. 1, 1984).
marriage.
The Board felt that appellant made a credible case for believing
she acquired a second nationality without forfeiting American citi-
zenship when she registered as a British subject. She showed that
she lived in the United Kingdom as a British subject, and when she
frequently came to the United States, she lived there as a United
States citizen. There was evidence appellant maintained close ties to
the United States over many years after she became a British sub-
ject. The affidavit of a prominent business executive who knew ap-
pellant when she obtained British citizenship, although executed
years after the event, effectively supported appellant's claims. He de-
clared that appellant made clear to him at the time she registered as
a British subject and thereafter that she never intended to relinquish
her United States citizenship. In the Board's view, appellant
strengthened her case by the candid, credible testimony she offered
at oral argument.
The Board did not consider the negative inference the Department
drew from appellant's failure to exercise the rights and duties of
American citizenship sufficient to support loss of citizenship. 0 7 The
Department has an affirmative duty to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that appellant intended to relinquish her United States
citizenship. Here, the evidence did not demonstrate a clear intention
to renounce citizenship.2
0 8
Appellant in In re A.A.P.2 °0 moved to Canada while a child, where
she grew up and studied law. To meet the citizenship requirements
for call to the Bar, appellant obtained Canadian citizenship. The
Board disagreed with the Department's contention that appellant's
conduct supported a finding of loss of citizenship. Naturalization
aside, appellant performed no subsequent act inconsistent with
United States citizenship. She claimed, and the record did not con-
tradict her, that she did not vote in Canada, obtain a Canadian pass-
port, or hold herself out solely as a Canadian citizen. The Board
found irrelevant the Department's contention that her orientation to
Canada, including living there many years, showed an intent to
abandon United States citizenship. That argument, the Board said,
was inconsistent with Schneider v. Rusk210 where the Supreme
Court held a United States citizen is free to live abroad indefinitely
without suffering loss of citizenship.21
In In re E.J.A.,212 an American citizen who taught at a French
207. Id. at 15.
208. Id. at 14-15.
209. In re A.A.P., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Nov. 10, 1983).
210. 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
211. A.A.P., slip op. at 10.
212. In re E.J.A., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Oct. 3, 1984).
[VOL 23: 261. 1986] Loss of Nationality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
University obtained naturalization in France to qualify for a tenured
professorship. Thereafter he obtained a French passport for a
planned trip to India with an all-French academic delegation. The
foregoing two actions apart, appellant did nothing inconsistent with
United States citizenship, although for several years after naturali-
zation he did nothing affirmatively to demonstrate he still considered
himself a United States citizen. The evidence was too ambiguous, in
the Board's view, to permit it to ascribe to appellant an intent to
relinquish United States citizenship when he became a citizen of
France. In concluding that the Department failed to make a persua-
sive case, the Board said the inferences the Department drew from
appellant's conduct were susceptible of more than one reasonable in-
terpretation. Conduct susceptible of more than one interpretation
could not be the basis for a finding of intent to surrender
citizenship.213
The circumstances under which appellant in In re C.P.B.21 4 ob-
tained naturalization in Venezuela were less than clear from the rec-
ord and were a material consideration in the Board's conclusion that
appellant did not intend to relinquish United States nationality when
he became a Venezuelan citizen. No copy of appellant's application
for citizenship came to light, and he denied making an oath of alle-
giance. He claimed he asked his attorney simply to obtain a resi-
dence visa for him and to take other steps to protect his business
interests as a non-Venezuelan. He said he signed no application for
naturalization, and despite the consulate's request to the Venezuelan
authorities for the required application, they sent none. The Board
noted that the indirectness and impersonal nature of the whole Vene-
zuelan naturalization process suggested appellant's intention was to
get whatever protection he could by improving or changing his status
in Venezuela, not necessarily to terminate United States citizenship.
It observed loss of citizenship could not hinge on facts which may be
construed as either signifying intent to retain or relinquish citizen-
ship. Noting the Supreme Court's directive that the facts and law
should be construed as far as reasonably possible in favor of the citi-
zen, 1 5 the Board resolved its doubts in favor of continuing appel-
lant's United States citizenship. 1
213. Id. at 13.
214. In re C.P.B., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 27, 1984).
215. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134 (1958); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
216. C.P.B., slip op. at 18.
An appellant's long commissioned service in the armed forces of
Canada was a crucial consideration in the Board's conclusion that he
intended to relinquish United States citizenship when he obtained
naturalization there.217 Three months after his birth in the United
States to non-United States citizen parents, appellant was taken
abroad. He never again resided in the United States. His father reg-
istered appellant at age ten as a British subject and citizen of New
Zealand. Six years later appellant went to Canada where he lived
continuously. In 1961 he entered the Canadian Navy, and in 1967
became naturalized. 218 Fifteen years later appellant inquired about
immigration to the United States, his first contact with United
States authorities in many years.
Affirming the Department's holding of loss of appellant's national-
ity, the Board said appellant manifested his intent to relinquish
United States nationality by a series of acts inconsistent with United
States citizenship.219 The Board found appellant's long service in the
Canadian Navy in particular to be in derogation of allegiance to the
United States and to manifest a transfer of allegiance from the
United States to Canada.220
The above decisions were unanimous, as indeed were most of the
decisions the Board rendered recently in cases involving loss of na-
tionality through naturalization in a foreign state not demanding re-
nunciation of previous nationality. In five cases decided since 1982,
however, the Board was unable to reach unanimity on the conclu-
sions of law to be drawn from an appellant's proven conduct. Two
are especially interesting for the sharpness with which they juxtapose
217. In re A.J.H., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Oct. 19, 1984).
218. The appellant's counsel argued that the appellant's acquisition of Cdnadian
citizenship under § 10(2) of the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946 did not constitute an
expatriating act within the meaning of § 349(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. (Section 10(2) of the Canadian Act authorized the grant of Canadian citizenship to
any person who was a British subject and who possessed certain stipulated qualifica-
tions). Counsel asserted that the appellant's acquisition of Canadian citizenship was not
naturalization, but more akin to the automatic acquisition of citizenship by certain per-
sons under the nationality laws of Israel and Ireland, in that § 10(2) confers Canadian
citizenship status upon a preexisting condition-the nationality of a commonwealth state.
Disagreeing, the Board held that the grant of Canadian citizenship to the appellant
was not automatic; the appellant was required to first apply and to demonstrate he could
satisfy certain statutory requirements. His acquisition of Canadian citizenship was thus
"naturalization" within the definition of that term in INA § 101(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. §
1 101(a)(23) (1982). A.J.H., slip op. at 14 ("the conferring of nationality of a state upon
a person after birth, by any means whatsoever") (emphasis added).
219. These acts included his voluntary naturalization in Canada; his swearing
oaths of allegiance to the British Crown upon his naturalization and earlier upon enter-
ing the Canadian Navy; his lack of expressed concern about or interest in United States
citizenship until 1982; his failure to seek documentation as a United States citizen; his
use of a New Zealand and later Canadian passport; and his 23 years' service in the
Canadian navy. A.J.H., slip op. at 14.
220. Id.
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two perceptions of what facts are sufficient to support a finding of
intentional expatriation.
In In re B.T.L.,221 appellant went to Canada in 1968 admittedly to
evade the draft. He soon learned he had been inducted and that a
warrant had been issued for his arrest. He did not return to the
United States, but remained in Canada where he married a Cana-
dian citizen, studied, and worked. In 1974 he became a Canadian
citizen. The indictment against appellant was dismissed in 1975. The
record was not clear on whether appellant knew of the likely dismis-
sal of the indictment against him before completing the final steps in
his naturalization process.
The majority concluded that a preponderance of the evidence did
not establish appellant's intention to relinquish United States citizen-
ship; accordingly, it reversed the Department's determination of loss
of nationality. The majority recognized that by 1979, when for the
first time since arriving in Canada, appellant asserted a claim to
United States citizenship, his circumstances had changed. He and
his Canadian wife had been divorced, he had remarried a United
States citizen, and the indictment against him had been dismissed.
Reasonable people might differ, the majority said, about the infer-
ences to be drawn from the fact that appellant attempted to establish
his American citizenship after his civil status had been so radically
changed. Had he changed his mind after naturalization and now
wanted to recoup his citizenship, or had he believed from the outset
that he never lost his citizenship because he never intended to sur-
render it? Did he proceed with naturalization after learning the in-
dictment might be dismissed because he wanted to end his United
States citizenship, or simply because he wanted to have citizenship
of the country where he intended to study? No single answer to
these kinds of questions was more plausible than another, the major-
ity reasoned. Appellant's passivity with respect to asserting a claim
to United States citizenship for five years did not, in the view of the
majority, suggest that appellant more likely than not intended to ter-
minate his United States citizenship. Some explicit act, not a series
of acts of omission, the majority stated, must be proved before the
trier of fact can with fair confidence conclude that the citizen in-
tended to surrender citizenship. 2 2 The dissenter argued that the De-
partment's holding was sound; appellant's intent seemed clear. His
entire conduct indicated a belief that he was no longer a United
221. In re B.T.L., State Dep't Dec., (B. App. R. July 27, 1984).
222. Id. at 11-12.
States citizen. He had had many opportunities before 1979 to show
that he considered himself a United States citizen, but did nothing
from 1974 to 1979 to indicate an interest in remaining a United
States citizen.223
In In re R.J.C.,224 the Board affirmed the Department's determi-
nation of loss of appellant's nationality. Appellant, a native born
United States citizen, was taken to Canada when he was twelve
years old. He grew up there and studied law. After completing his
studies, appellant could be only provisionally articled since he was
not a Canadian citizen. To be fully articled and to be eligible for call
to the bar, he obtained Canadian citizenship in 1973.
Around 1982, appellant's business interests prompted him to think
about having access to the United States as an American citizen. He
therefore sought to clarify his status. It appeared appellant had
voted in Canada but did not take part in Canadian politics. He con-
ceded that after naturalization he habitually identified himself as a
Canadian when he crossed the border between the United States and
Canada, but said he did not obtain a Canadian passport. Aside from
American clients, his associations with the United States were mini-
mal, although in his submissions and during oral argument he pro-
fessed a strong and consistent admiration for things American.
During oral argument, the Board asked appellant whether there
were people who knew him when he became naturalized who could
offer evidence with respect to the issue of his intent in 1973. He
replied there were many who knew him and knew he considered
himself to be an American as well as a Canadian citizen; he was not
sure, however, how definitively such people would now testify. He
undertook to obtain affidavits to support his claim of lack of intent to
abandon American citizenship, but in the end submitted only his
own affidavit.
In the view of the majority there was a clear pattern in appellant's
conduct from 1973 to 1982 from which an inference of intent to re-
linquish his United States citizenship might properly be drawn. In
all respects he acted as a Canadian, in none as a United States citi-
zen. Although he emphasized that his ties to the United States and
his identification of himself as an American were widely known, he
could not produce evidence supporting his contentions, even though
he had specifically named people who could provide affidavits.
225
The majority concluded that the record supported a finding that
223. Id. at 16-17, 20.
224. In re R.J.C., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Mar. 20, 1985). The Board denied
appellant's motion for reconsideration of its decision. See supra notes 58-60 and accom-
panying text.
225. R.J.C., slip op. at 9-12.
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appellant intended to relinquish his United States citizenship. 226
The dissenter in this case did not consider the facts that appellant
voted in Canada but not the United States, paid income tafes in
Canada but did not file United States income tax returns (he alleg-
edly had no income taxable in the United States), and had no close
personal associations or property interests in the United States rele-
vant to the issue of his intent. The other actions cited by the major-
ity were arguably more germane. Appellant was imprudent not to
seek official advice before applying for naturalization, and in delay-
ing for many years clarifying his citizenship status. Acting incau-
tiously, however, is not per se expressive of a renunciatory intent.
Appellant's situation did not distinguish him from many other appel-
lants who have been successful before the Board. Also, his original
perception that he could acquire Canadian citizenship without jeop-
ardizing United States citizenship, although erroneous, is a com-
monly held belief among many people who obtain naturalization in
Canada where dual citizenship is officially recognized. 2
Why appellant did not or could not submit affidavits from people
who knew him in 1973 was, in the view of the dissent, far from clear.
But even if it were assumed that appellant tried and could not in-
duce his acquaintances to give evidence, his failure to do so did not
add weight to the Department's case; it is the government's burden
to prove intent, not the appellant's to prove lack thereof.2 28
Naturalization with Renunciatory Oath
Like the United States, many countries require applicants for nat-
uralization to make both an oath of allegiance and a declaration re-
nouncing former nationality or allegiance.2 9
Renouncing United States nationality or allegiance in foreign nat-
226. Id. at 13.
227. Id. at 17-19.
228. Id. at 20-22.
229. Australia, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and the Philippines, inter alia, require the
making of renunciatory declaration.
In Australia and Brazil the applicant must renounce all other allegiance; the name of
the country concerned is not specified. Israel, Mexico, and the Philippines require the
declarant expressly name the country whose nationality he surrenders. Israeli law pro-
vides an applicant may be exempt from the renunciatory statement upon petition to, and
at the discretion of, the Minister of Interior.
As a matter of law, the difference between expressly renouncing United States citizen-
ship and renouncing all other allegiance is purely semantic. A person who is aware of
being a United States citizen can have no doubt that by renouncing all other allegiance
he or she is foreswearing allegiance owed to the United States.
uralization proceedings does not, in itself of course, work expatria-
tion, for it is not formal renunciation of United States nationality
within the terms of the statute.230 Making such a declaration does,
however, express more eloquently a person's intent with respect to
United States citizenship than merely swearing an oath of allegiance
to the foreign state. And the case law makes it clear that such a
pledge to a foreign state manifests an intent to relinquish United
States nationality. 23 1 Thus, if one who seeks foreign naturalization
knowingly and understandingly pledges allegiance to a foreign state
and renounces United States nationality, such conduct will generally
support a finding of intent to relinquish United States citizenship.23 2
Richards v. Secretary of State233 is particularly relevant. Appel-
lant, Richards, obtained naturalization in Canada in 1971 upon
pledging allegiance to Queen Elizabeth the Second and declaring
that he "renounced all allegiance and fidelity to any sovereign or
state of whom or of which I may at this time be a subject or citi-
zen." 234 In affirming the district court's judgment that Richards ex-
patriated himself, the Ninth Circuit said the voluntary taking of a
formal oath that includes an explicit renunciation of United States
citizenship "is ordinarily sufficient to establish an intent to renounce
United States citizenship. 23 5
Appellants have argued that the Board should not give decisive
weight to their renunciatory oath because in making it they were not
motivated by a desire to terminate United States citizenship; they
had no wish to acquire foreign nationality independently of a per-
ceived need to do So. 2 3 6 This line of argument is unsustainable. A
person's motive in making a renunciatory pledge of allegiance to a
foreign state is irrelevant to the issue of his intent, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit made absolutely clear in Richards when it rejected appellant's
contention he did not really wish to foreswear allegiance to the
United States. The court said:
Under Richards' theory, a renunciation of United States citizenship would
be effective only if motivated by a principled, abstract desire to sever alle-
230. INA § 349(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1982).
231. United States v. Matheson, 400 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). ("[a]n
oath expressly renouncing United States citizenship ... would have little room for am-
biguity as to the intent of the applicant").
232. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1981).
233. 753 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1985).
234. From 1947 to 1973, under Canadian citizenship regulations, applicants for
naturalization (excepting British subjects) were required to renounce all other allegiance.
On April 3, 1973, the Federal Court of Canada declared the applicable section of the
regulations ultra vires. Ulin v. The Queen, 35 D.L.R.3d 738 (1973).
235. 753 F.2d at 1421.
236. See e.g., In re F.D.C., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Feb. 22, 1985); In re
M.S.B., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Jan. 16, 1985); In re L.G., State Dep't Dec. (B.
App. R. Jan. 19, 1984).
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giance to the United States. That theory is contrary to all of the case law
concerning voluntary expatriation.
A person's free choice to renounce United States citizenship is effective
whatever the motivation .... 137
Although making a renunciatory oath of allegiance to a foreign
state is compelling evidence of an intent to relinquish United States
citizenship, the courts admonish the trier of fact to be satisfied that
there are no other elements in the record that might warrant a dif-
ferent conclusion.238 The Board has consistently heeded this admoni-
tion. But in no recent case has the Board found ancillary evidence
sufficiently persuasive to negate the evidence of a renunciatory intent
inherent in forswearing allegiance to the United States. Since 1982
the Board has affirmed the Department's determination of loss of
nationality in every appeal where an appellant made a renunciatory
oath of allegiance. Of course, it is conceivable that there may be
situations where the party who swears a renunciatory oath can pro-
duce evidence sufficient to offset the oath; the Board has not recently
encountered such a case, however.
In none of the cases taken to the Board has there been contempo-
rary evidence of an intent to retain United States citizenship. The
only disclaimers to lack of intent have been self-serving statements
made after performance of the expatriative act. The facts in each
case disclosed that the appellant had facility in the language of the
state where citizenship was sought and, as a matter of law, was com-
petent to understand the meaning and consequences of the renuncia-
tory declaration. Without exception the appellant's conduct subse-
quent to performing the expatriative act raised no reasonable doubts
about the will and purpose he or she manifested in making the re-
nunciatory oath.
In re M.J.C. is illustrative .239 Appellant obtained naturalization in
Canada in 1969. On appeal from the Department's 1982 holding
that she voluntarily became a Canadian citizen with the intent to
relinquish her United States citizenship, appellant contended that
she did not understand making an oath of allegiance that includes a
renunciatory declaration could lead to loss of her United States citi-
zenship. The Board found her contention unpersuasive. She had ob-
tained naturalization when she was twenty-eight years old, was em-
237. 753 F.2d at 1421.
238. See, e.g., Richards v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1985); Ter-
razas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981).
239. In re M.J.C., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 12, 1984).
ployed in a responsible position at the time, and had conceded that
she was accustomed to signing documents in her own right after
marriage and tried to read them through before signing. Upholding
the Department's decision that appellant expatriated herself, the
Board concluded that for twelve years she had done nothing palpable
to maintain her United States citizenship; her unsupported latter-
day statements that she never ceased to consider herself a United
States citizen were insufficient, in the Board's opinion, to vitiate her
categoric repudiation of United States citizenship in 1969.240
Declaration of Allegiance to a Foreign State
Swearing an oath of allegiance or making a formal declaration of
allegiance to a foreign state incident to naturalization is not expatri-
ating; the operative act is considered to be obtaining naturaliza-
tion.241 Making a meaningful oath of allegiance to a foreign state in
another context, however, may result in expatriation. 24
2
The only appeals the Board has heard in the past four years from
determinations of loss of nationality resulting from the making of an
oath of allegiance to a foreign state have been those taken by dual
nationals of the United States and Mexico. These individuals be-
came citizens of both countries by operation of law through being
born in the United States of Mexican parents or in Mexico of United
States citizen parents. In re Lawrence J. Terraza 243 is the classic
example. Such appeals constitute the second largest number the
Board hears.
Mexican public policy does not tolerate dual nationality after mi-
nority. A dual national must elect Mexican or his other nationality
upon attaining the age of eighteen. If such person wishes to exercise
the rights of Mexican nationality, he must possess a certificate of
Mexican nationality 44 application for which must be made one year
240. Id. at 13.
241. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1262(a)(3) (1984).
242. INA § 349(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1982). See supra note 111. Swear-
ing an oath of allegiance to a foreign state is not considered expatriative in the case of a
dual national of the United States and a foreign state who acquired foreign nationality
by operation of law. "[C]onduct merely declaratory of what one national aspect of dual
citizenship necessarily connotes, cannot reasonably be construed as an act of renunciation
of the other national aspect of the actor's dual status." Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 379,
381 (3d Cir. 1958). A different situation exists, however, where one who is a dual na-
tional of the United States and a foreign state not only swears allegiance to the foreign
state but also expressly renounces United States citizenship.
243. In re Terrazas, State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Apr. 29, 1975). This case led to
the litigation discussed earlier in this Article.
244. Nationality and Naturalization Law of January 5, 1934, Art. 57 (DIARIO OF-
FICIAL, Jan. 20, 1934), as amended Dec. 27, 1971 (DIARIO OFFICIAL, Dec. 29, 1971);
Regulations for the Issuance of a Certificate of Mexican Nationality (DIARIO OFFICIAL
Oct. 18, 1972).
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after the person becomes eighteen. 5
To obtain a certificate of Mexican nationality the applicantmust
expressly renounce his or her other nationality or nationalities and
make a declaration of allegiance to Mexico.246 Making a renuncia-
tory oath in conjunction with foreign naturalization and declaring
allegiance to a foreign state while expressly renouncing United
States citizenship are conceptually analogous, and the legal princi-
ples discussed in the previous section are applicable to the Mexican
cases. 247 In brief, the words one subscribes to in both situations man-
ifest an intent to relinquish United States nationality.
The Board must, of course, consider carefully all the circum-
stances surrounding the application for a certificate of Mexican na-
tionality to determine whether there might be evidence of a lack of
intent contemporaneous with making the renunciatory pledge. For,
as the Seventh Circuit indicated in Terrazas v. Haig,2 48 a finding of
intent to relinquish citizenship depends on the actor having know-
ingly and understandingly made the renunciatory declaration. 249
Without exception the Board has found that the applicant had com-
mand of Spanish, was schooled, and as a matter of law, was capable
of understanding the implications of making an explicit repudiation
of United States citizenship. Furthermore, the conduct of appellants
after obtaining the certificate of Mexican nationality had not evi-
denced an intent to retain United States nationality. 250
The Mexican cases tend to be of a pattern, involving people who
were faced with a difficult personal decision at or shortly after age
eighteen. Circumstances seem to lead them to opt for Mexican citi-
zenship. Most have lived all their lives in Mexico, studying and plan-
ning careers there. When confronted with the necessity of choice of
245. DIARIO OFFICIAL, supra note 254.
246. The operative language of the application reads as follows:
I therefore hereby expressly renounce . . . citizenship as well as my submis-
sion, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of
... which I might have been subject, all protection foreign to the laws and
authorities of Mexico, all rights which treaties or international law grant to
foreigners; and furthermore I swear adherence, obedience, and submission to
the laws and authorities of the Mexican Republic.
The United. States-Mexican dual national must write the words "United States" in the
blank spaces on the form.
247. See supra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
248. 653 F.2d 285 (1981).
249. Id. at 288-89.
250. See, e.g., In re J.T.C., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Jan. 21, 1986); In re
A.R.E., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Dec. 10, 1985); In re R.A.S., State Dep't Dec. (B.
App. R. Nov. 8, 1985).
citizenship, most appear to consider that claiming United States citi-
zenship, which requires that they leave Mexico and obtain permis-
sion to return as resident aliens, is not a viable alternative.
The Board is not indifferent to the situation of these people, but
where the record establishes that the declaration of allegiance to
Mexico was knowingly and understandingly made, the Board has no
alternative but to conclude that the requisite intent to relinquish
United States citizenship has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. 251 As the Board observed in In re S.N.V.,2 52 it was unfortu-
nate that appellant acted hastily, and made no prior inquiries about
the legal effect of his act on his United States citizenship. However,
the words in the application to which he subscribed should have con-
veyed to him the gravity of the step he was taking, and as a matter
of law he must be held accountable for his actions.253
Serving in the Armed Forces of a Foreign State
Appeals to the Board from determinations of loss of nationality
arising from service in the armed forces of a foreign state are rare;
hardly strange, however, since in the past four years the Department
has made only four determinations of loss of nationality on those
grounds. One interesting case is In re H.M.O., 2 4 a vestige of World
251. Many appellants seem to be unaware they may jeopardize their United States
citizenship by applying for and obtaining a certificate of Mexican nationality. The
United States authorities in Mexico have endeavored to bring this fact to the attention of
dual nationals. A document issued by the United States Embassy at Mexico City sets out
clearly and in detail the provisions of Mexican law requiring dual nationals to elect be-
tween their nationalities upon attaining the age of 18. It warns that making a formal
declaration of allegiance to Mexico is a potentially expatriating act under United States
law. UNITED STATES EMBASSY, MExIco CITY, Mex/PPT-31 GLQ (Dec. 1979).
The fact so many young appellants seem unaware of the legal effect on their United
States citizenship of making an oath of allegiance to Mexico suggests, however, the need
for a broad, continuing effort to apprise United States-Mexican nationals of the provi-
sions of the law of both countries.
252. In re S.N.V., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 25, 1984).
253. Id. at 10.
254. In re H.M.O., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. June 6, 1983). The appeal was
not time-barred because the appellant's expatriating act, performed in 1944, was not
disclosed until 1981 when the appellant sought to register as a United States national at
the Embassy in Tokyo. The Department held that appellant expatriated himself under
the provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(c), 54 Stat. 1137, 1168-69,
which provided:
A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturali-
zation, shall lose his nationality by:
(c) Entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless expressly
authorized by the laws of the United States, if he has or acquires the national-
ity of such foreign state.
The analogous provision of the present statute, INA § 349(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3)
(1982) reads:
From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national of
the United States whether by birth or naturalization shall lose his nationality
by: (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless, prior
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War II. In this case, appellant was born in Hawaii of Japanese par-
ents who took him, while still a child, to Japan several years before
the outbreak of war. He enlisted in the Japanese Naval Air Arm in
1944, but alleged on appeal he was a volunteer only in a technical
sense. His enlistment came at a time when Japan drafted all high
school students. He claimed that even to allege one did not wish to
volunteer in wartime conditions never entered his mind.
The Board found that appellant entered the armed forces of Japan
voluntarily, and proceeded to determine whether he performed the
proscribed act with the intention of relinquishing his United States
citizenship. In examining appellant's intent, the Board took as its
point of departure the Attorney General's statement of interpretation
of Afroyim, 25 5 wherein the Attorney General stated:
with respect to service in a foreign army ... an individual who enlists in
the armed forces of an allied country does not necessarily evidence that by
so doing he intends to abandon his U.S. citizenship. But it is highly persua-
sive evidence, to say the least, of an intent to abandon U.S. citizenship if
one enlists voluntarily in the armed forces of a foreign government engaged
in hostilities against the United States.
25
6
The Board noted that the record was barren of any evidence con-
temporaneous with appellant's entry into the Japanese Navy which
might reveal his United States citizenship, except his performance of
an act that in itself may be highly persuasive evidence of an intent to
transfer his allegiance from the United States to Japan. Thirty-six
years passed before he asserted a claim to United States citizenship
and disclaimed any intent to relinquish United States citizenship
when he entered the Japanese Navy. The Board found that appel-
lant's conduct subsequent to his performance of the expatriating act
raised no reasonable doubt about his specific intent to abandon
United States citizenship.257
to such entry or service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in writ-
ing by the Secretary of State of Defense; Provided, That (sic) the entry into
such service by a person prior to the attainment of his eighteenth birthday shall
serve to expatriate such person only if there exists an option to secure a release
from such service and such person fails to exercise such option at the attain-
ment of his eighteenth birthday.
255. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969).
256. Id. at 401.
257. H.M.O., slip op. at 17-18. The Board stated:
The record does not show that he made any effort to assert a claim to United
States citizenship between the end of the war and his first application at the
United States Embassy in Tokyo on January 21, 1981, for registration as a
United States citizen. He held a Japanese passport issued November 9, 1979.
There is no evidence of record to show that by any of his everyday acts in the
period since the war that he considered he was still an American citizen, ac-
Serving in the Government of a Foreign State
Since 1980, the Department has made four determinations of loss
of nationality on the grounds that a citizen served in the government
of a foreign state. 58 Appeals were filed from two of those determina-
tions: In re M.F.,259 and In re Meir Kahane; the latter case is at this
writing under consideration by the Board.
In In re M.F., appellant was born in the United States. She ac-
quired the nationality of Israel automatically under the Law of Re-
turn210 when she later went there to live and work. A university
teacher, appellant became active in women's affairs in Israel, gaining
national prominence. She ran for the Knesset in 1974 and won one
of the three seats won by a minor party championing women's rights;
she served from 1974 to 1977. Upon installation as a member she
swore an oath of allegiance to Israel. At the request of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, she surrendered her unexpired United States
passport and agreed to travel only on her official Israeli passport.
By a vote of two to one, the Board reversed the Department's de-
termination that appellant expatriated herself. The majority noted
that service in an important political post in a foreign government
may be highly persuasive evidence of an intent to relinquish citizen-
ship,2 1 but it is not conclusive evidence. Under the rule in Vance v.
cepting the obligations as well as the rights of such citizenship.
In such conduct we find a clear abandonment of United States citizenship.
Id.
258. In re M.F., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Jan. 29, 1985).
259. Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(4)(A)
(1982), provides that a U.S. national shall lose nationality by:
accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employ-
ment under the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof,
if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state; or . . . accepting,
serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under
the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, for which
office, post, or employment an oath, affirmation, or declaration of allegiance is
required ....
260. See supra note 186.
261. M.F., slip op. at 8. Here, the Board relied on 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969) in
which the Attorney General stated:
.. . it is obviously not enough to establish a voluntary relinquishment of citi-
zenship that an individual accepts employment as a public school teacher in a
foreign country. This I have already decided in the case of a dual national
... A different case would be presented by an individual's acceptance of an
important political post in a foreign government. Id. at 401.
The only reported federal case since Afroyim involving service by a United States
citizen in an important position in a foreign government is Peter v. Secretary of State,
347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972). As precedent, however, Peter is not helpful, for the
standard of proof the three-judge court applied was "clear, convincing and unequivocal"
evidence, not a "preponderance of the evidence," as required by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Vance, 444 U.S. at 267. In Peter, the plaintiff, a dual national of the United
States and Hungary, served for many years in an important position in Hungarian Ra-
dio, travelled to the United States and abroad on a Hungarian passport and had no
contact for many years with United States authorities in Hungary. The court held that
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Terrazas, the proscribed act will not result in expatriation unless the
citizen intended to relinquish United States citizenship.262
Although some of appellant's actions suggested an intent to relin-
quish citizenship, the majority took the view that the record showed
her thoroughgoing, outspoken identification as an American within
the community and the Israeli legislature. Other considerations influ-
encing the majority were the unexpected nature of her election; her
lack of political responsibilities in the Knesset; her low profile as a
Knesset member; and her consistent pattern of identifying herself as
an American. These factors narrowly overcame other evidence that
she intended to relinquish her United States citizenship. Since the
majority felt that appellant's conduct left the issue of her intent in
doubt, and since it is incumbent on the Board to resolve doubts in
favor of retention of citizenship, the majority concluded that appel-
lant lacked the intent to terminate her United States citizenship.263
The dissenting member maintained that appellant knowingly and
intentionally surrendered her United States citizenship. Noting that
there was no concrete contemporary evidence to support the major-
ity's finding of appellant's lack of intent, the dissent asserted that
appellant's conduct during her service in the national legislature
manifested not only an intent to transfer allegiance to the foreign
state but also prevented her from giving continued and undivided
allegiance to the United States. In the opinion of the dissenter, ap-
pellant's statements made in 1978 and at the hearing to the effect
that she had no intention to relinquish United States citizenship
were "contravened by her voluntary acceptance of service" in the
Knesset, by pledging allegiance to Israel, by declaring faithfully to
discharge her duties, by serving in the parliament for three years and
by other conduct at the time she was a member of the parliament.264
Formal Renunciation of United States Nationality
Formal renunciation of United States nationality results in the
second largest number of annual determinations by the Department
of loss of nationality.265 In the past four years the Department has
the facts of the case did not support by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence an
inference of plaintiff's intent to relinquish United States citizenship; nor were plaintiff's
acts shown to be so inconsistent with United States citizenship as to result in loss of that
citizenship.
262. M.F., slip op. at 12.
263. Id. at 10-12.
264. Id. at 22.
265. For the text of the applicable statutory provision, INA § 349(a)(5), 8 U.S.C.
made approximately 1000 such determinations. Yet, in the same pe-
riod, no more than twenty renunciants have appealed to the Board.
In only a few cases did the Board reach the merits of the appeal;
most were time-barred.
The right of every American citizen to terminate citizenship is
natural and inherent. Provided the citizen acts voluntarily and with
full consciousness of the serious consequences of the act, exercise of
that right may not be denied.266
If an appellant acted deliberately and under no duress and was
capable of appreciating the serious consequences of this most cat-
egoric act of alienage, a finding of intent to relinquish citizenship
follows almost ineluctably. Intent, in cases of this character, is im-
plicit in the language of the renunciatory oath: "I hereby absolutely
and entirely renounce my United States nationality together with all
rights and privileges and all duties of allegiance and fidelity there-
unto pertaining."
The circumstances under which most renunciants who appeal to
the Board gave up their citizenship have left no doubt that they ac-
ted voluntarily, wholly aware of the ramifications of renunciation.
The events incident to the renunciation of appellant in In re
K.M.M., 267 however, led the Board to question whether he had fully
grasped the gravity of his action.
Appellant was eighteen years of age when he made a formal re-
nunciation of his United States nationality at the Embassy in Ot-
tawa,268 allegedly because he had been told he would have to surren-
§ 1481(a)(5) (1982), see supra note 114. This estimate is based on statistics furnished to
the Board by the Office of Citizens Consular Services. See supra notes 185-86 and ac-
companying text.
266. See supra note 4. Formal renunciation of United States nationality may often
result in statelessness. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for one, has argued renun-
ciation should not be accepted if it would leave the renunciant with no citizenship. See
Ulman, Nationality, Expatriation and Statelessness, 25 AD. L. REV., 113, 125 (1973).
The case law, however, makes clear that formal renunciation of citizenship does not
require acquisition of another nationality. Davis v. INS, 481 F. Supp. 1178, 1182
(D.D.C. 1979) states that:
The Oath of Renunciation recited by the petitioner, as applied to the appli-
cable federal law, revoked the petitioner's citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5)
does not require allegiance to another nation; it only requires renunciation of
United States nationality.
The imposition of statelessness upon the petitioner cannot deter this court from
the requirements of the federal nationality law. The Supreme Court recognized
that expatriation may result in statelessness in Afroyim v. Rusk. In Afroyim
the Court declared that "[i]n some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that
a man is left without the protection of citizenship in any country in the
world-as a man without a country." 387 U.S. at 268.
267. In re K.M.M., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. Mar. 16, 1983).
268. A person under the age of 18 may effectively renounce United States nation-
ality, unless, within six months after attaining the age of 18, he or she asserts a claim to
United States citizenship in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of State. INA §
351(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1483(b) (1982), provides:
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der his United States citizenship to enlist in the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. The record showed that two years before his renun-
ciation he had been discharged from the United States Marine
Corps after a month's service as unfit for military life. Later, he en-
listed in the United States Navy and served barely six months when
he was separated, again as unsuited for military life.
The Board found that appellant acted voluntarily. However, it re-
versed the Department's determination of loss of nationality because
it entertained substantial doubt whether appellant renounced his na-
tionality with full awareness of the consequences. Although appel-
lant made the renunciation in the form prescribed by the Secretary
of State and signed the required statement of understanding of the
serious consequences of renunciation, the Board did not think it fol-
lowed ineluctably that because an eighteen year old citizen volunta-
rily subscribed to a formal oath of renunciation he had the requisite
intent to relinquish United States nationality. Resolution of the issue
of appellant's intent depended, the Board said, on an assessment of
all the surrounding facts and circumstances.2 69
The Board found that both the Embassy and the Department had
handled appellant's case casually and contrary to the dictates of ele-
mentary fairness. It was the Board's unanimous conclusion that
given appellant's age, his evident immaturity and the possibility he
might have had insufficient time to digest the consular officer's ex-
planation of the serious consequences of renunciation-matters
which both the Embassy and the Department should have taken
fully into account-it was problematical that appellant acted in full
awareness of the consequences of his act.27 °
The Attitude Appropriate for Judgment
In deciding appeals, the Board of Appellate Review has two cor-
relative responsibilities: to apply a law "designated to preserve and
uphold the dignity and priceless value of citizenship, with attendant
A national who within six months after attaining the age of eighteen years
asserts his claim to United States nationality, in such manner as the Secretary
of State shall by regulation prescribe, shall not be deemed to have expatriated
himself by the commission, prior to his eighteenth birthday, of any of the acts
specified in paragraphs (2), (4), (5) and (6) of section 1481 (a) of this title.
Act of October 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 92 Stat. 1046 amended § 351(b) by
repealing paragraph (5) (voting in a foreign election), and renumbering paragraphs (2),
(4), and (6) as (2), (4), and (5) respectively. See supra note 72.
269. K.M.M., slip op. at 7.
270. Id. at 10-11.
obligations; 271 and to ensure American citizenship is not "lightly
taken away.
'" 72
In discharging its office, the Board is not wittingly activist. In each
case, the Board must conscientiously apply the statute, as interpreted
by the courts, to the facts of record. An appellant's character (admi-
rable or not) is irrelevant. To paraphrase the opinion of a federal
judge who held that a plaintiff engaged in "criminal and unsavory
activities" was not deportable because he convinced the court he was
an American citizen: the duty of the Board is to decide the questions
of law and fact presented in each proceeding, not to pass judgment
on the morality of an appellant's life.273
The controlling case law allows the Board a measure of discretion
in certain kinds of appeals to determine whether an appellant in-
tended to retain or relinquish citizenship-a discretion to be exer-
cised prudently. Decisions must not reflect the predilections of mem-
bers. Yet, however much we try to see things objectively, we can
never see them with any eyes but our own. 74
That members see facts with no eyes but their own is borne out by
the divided decisions reviewed above. Different perceptions of the ev-
identiary value of proven conduct tend to emerge mainly in appeals
involving foreign naturalization without renunciation of previous na-
tionality because there is often more scope in such appeals for rea-
sonable people to differ about the inferences to be drawn from a
party's actions. Similar differences could as readily arise in cases in-
volving other acts declared expatriative under the statute if the deci-
sion were to turn on inferring intent from the appellant's proven con-
duct after the individual did the expatriating act.
Some members submit that even though the record shows an ap-
pellant did not take specific steps to affirm or document United
States citizenship after obtaining naturalization of a foreign state,
there may be reasonable doubt the individual knowingly and intelli-
gently intended to surrender citizenship, unless the party also per-
formed some act explicitly and affirmatively derogatory of allegiance
to the United States. Here the dictum of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit seems pertinent:
Afroyim's requirement of a subjective intent reflects the growing trend in
our constitutional jurisprudence toward the principle that conduct will be
construed as a waiver or forfeiture of a constitutional right only if it is
knowingly and intelligently intended as such. Surely the Fourteenth
Amendment right of citizenship cannot be characterized as a trivial matter
justifying departure from this rule.
2 75
271. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1961). See supra note 122.
272. Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
273. Liacakos v. Kennedy, 195 F. Supp. 630 (D.D.C. 1961).
274. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921).
275. United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Other members have expressed the view that judicial precedent does
not require that a party necessarily act overtly and unequivocally in
order to evince an intent to surrender United States citizenship. Per-
formance of a statutory expatriating act-in itself highly persuasive
evidence of intent--combined with a pattern of conduct that indi-
cates an abandonment of the rights and duties of citizenship may be
sufficient to express an expatriative will.
The divergences shown by these two tendencies are not doctrinal.
They center rather on the criteria to be applied in judging the evi-
dence in an area where the courts have yet given little guidance.
Until the courts are called upon to make conclusions of law from
facts similar to those in foreign naturalization cases, it seems inevita-
ble that Board unanimity will at times be elusive.
In In re B.T.L.,2 76 discussed above with respect to naturalization
in a state that does not require the applicant to renounce previous
citizenship, the dissenting member made a fair criticism of the first
of the two tendencies just summarized. If the Board continued to
adopt the position of the majority in In re B.T.L., the dissenter
wrote, it would substantially eliminate the practical possibility of
sustaining the Department of State's determinations of loss of na-
tionality in cases involving naturalization in a foreign state which
does not require renunciation of former nationality. He did not be-
lieve that the judicial precedent cited by the majority was meant to
have such an effect.2
It is inherent, however, in the doctrine of intent, that the govern-
ment will find it difficult to sustain its burden of proof in finely bal-
anced cases.278 The Supreme Court has charged the trier of fact to
make the final judgment whether the individual comes within the
terms of the statute and indeed intended to relinquish citizenship.7 9
In rendering judgment, the Board can do no more than endeavor to
adopt "the attitude appropriate for judgment, 28 0 mindful that
"when we deal with citizenship we tread on sensitive ground,' 281 and
mindful too that in these proceedings "the facts and the law should
be construed as far as is reasonably possible in favor of the
citizen. 282
276. In re B.T.L., State Dep't Dec. (B. App. R. July 27, 1984).
277. Id. at 20-21.
278. Proving intent is "in itself a heavy burden." Vance, 444 U.S. at 267.
279. Id. at 261.
280. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 667 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
281. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 197 (1956).
282. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134 (1958).

